Rhetorical Recovery and Real GDP Stagnation in Syria
The Political Economy of Official Economic Estimates
5 minute read – March 24, 2026
Syrian Center for Policy Research:
The transitional authority presents indicators of economic performance that suggest a rapid recovery of gross domestic product and an imminent return to pre-conflict levels, without publishing a clear methodology for calculation, distinguishing between GDP at current prices and GDP at constant prices, or clarifying the effect of multiple exchange rates and inflation on the announced value. The flaw here is not limited to the accuracy of one particular figure; rather, it extends to the very structure of economic governance itself, as the exaggeration in the use of undocumented macroeconomic indicators reveals the marginalization of the national data system and the treatment of GDP as an instrument of political discourse rather than as an instrument of scientific measurement on which public policies should be based. Thus, the data crisis becomes part of the crisis of economic governance, not merely a technical statistical problem.
Based on its methodology of measurement during the conflict, the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimates that real GDP in 2025 achieved only marginal growth of about 3 per thousand compared with 2024, while real GDP per capita declined by about 6 percent owing to strong population growth associated with the return of part of the refugees. The actual size of GDP in 2025 did not exceed about 45 percent of its 2010 level at constant prices. Sectoral indicators confirm this stagnation: agricultural production contracted sharply under the impact of drought and rising costs; manufacturing declined as a result of shortages of inputs, energy, and liquidity, and its exposure to imports; and the real value of government services fell as a result of austerity policies. Other sectors, such as communications and some transport, trade, and construction activities, improved relatively, but this improvement is insufficient to lead a sustainable economic recovery.
Correcting the economic trajectory requires beginning with the reconstruction of an independent and transparent national data system as a primary precondition for recovery. This requires enabling statistical institutions to produce periodic indicators that can be verified, publishing the methodologies and assumptions used in estimating GDP and macroeconomic indicators, and carrying out a comprehensive national assessment of the effects of the conflict on the population, production, capital stock, and public wealth. It also requires refraining from using exaggerated or unreliable figures in public discourse, linking economic decision-making to evidence rather than propaganda, and reviewing the policies that constrained growth, most notably: austerity, unregulated trade liberalization, rising production costs, liquidity restraint, the shrinking developmental role of the state, and the offering of public assets through non-transparent arrangements. Building confidence in the Syrian economy begins with building confidence in its data, because any discourse not supported by independent and transparent measurement will not lead to real growth, but rather to further policy distortions and an erosion of public trust.
– March 24, 2026
Rhetorical Recovery and Real GDP Stagnation in Syria
The Political Economy of Official Economic Estimates
Click here to read the full paper:
Rhetorical Recovery and Real GDP Stagnation in Syria
The Political Economy of Official Economic Estimates
5 minute read – March 24, 2026
Syrian Center for Policy Research:
The transitional authority presents indicators of economic performance that suggest a rapid recovery of gross domestic product and an imminent return to pre-conflict levels, without publishing a clear methodology for calculation, distinguishing between GDP at current prices and GDP at constant prices, or clarifying the effect of multiple exchange rates and inflation on the announced value. The flaw here is not limited to the accuracy of one particular figure; rather, it extends to the very structure of economic governance itself, as the exaggeration in the use of undocumented macroeconomic indicators reveals the marginalization of the national data system and the treatment of GDP as an instrument of political discourse rather than as an instrument of scientific measurement on which public policies should be based. Thus, the data crisis becomes part of the crisis of economic governance, not merely a technical statistical problem.
Based on its methodology of measurement during the conflict, the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimates that real GDP in 2025 achieved only marginal growth of about 3 per thousand compared with 2024, while real GDP per capita declined by about 6 percent owing to strong population growth associated with the return of part of the refugees. The actual size of GDP in 2025 did not exceed about 45 percent of its 2010 level at constant prices. Sectoral indicators confirm this stagnation: agricultural production contracted sharply under the impact of drought and rising costs; manufacturing declined as a result of shortages of inputs, energy, and liquidity, and its exposure to imports; and the real value of government services fell as a result of austerity policies. Other sectors, such as communications and some transport, trade, and construction activities, improved relatively, but this improvement is insufficient to lead a sustainable economic recovery.
Correcting the economic trajectory requires beginning with the reconstruction of an independent and transparent national data system as a primary precondition for recovery. This requires enabling statistical institutions to produce periodic indicators that can be verified, publishing the methodologies and assumptions used in estimating GDP and macroeconomic indicators, and carrying out a comprehensive national assessment of the effects of the conflict on the population, production, capital stock, and public wealth. It also requires refraining from using exaggerated or unreliable figures in public discourse, linking economic decision-making to evidence rather than propaganda, and reviewing the policies that constrained growth, most notably: austerity, unregulated trade liberalization, rising production costs, liquidity restraint, the shrinking developmental role of the state, and the offering of public assets through non-transparent arrangements. Building confidence in the Syrian economy begins with building confidence in its data, because any discourse not supported by independent and transparent measurement will not lead to real growth, but rather to further policy distortions and an erosion of public trust.
