Policy Brief

المركز السوري لبحوث السياسات
Syrian Center for Policy Research



Rhetorical Recovery and Real GDP Stagnation in Syria

The Political Economy of Official Economic Estimates

March 2026

Syrian Center for Policy Research

Executive Summary

The transitional authority presents indicators of economic performance that suggest a rapid recovery of gross domestic product and an imminent return to pre-conflict levels, without publishing a clear methodology for calculation, distinguishing between GDP at current prices and GDP at constant prices, or clarifying the effect of multiple exchange rates and inflation on the announced value. The flaw here is not limited to the accuracy of one particular figure; rather, it extends to the very structure of economic governance itself, as the exaggeration in the use of undocumented macroeconomic indicators reveals the marginalization of the national data system and the treatment of GDP as an instrument of political discourse rather than as an instrument of scientific measurement on which public policies should be based. Thus, the data crisis becomes part of the crisis of economic governance, not merely a technical statistical problem.

Based on its methodology of measurement during the conflict, the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimates that real GDP in 2025 achieved only marginal growth of about 3 per thousand compared with 2024, while real GDP per capita declined by about 6 percent owing to strong population growth associated with the return of part of the refugees. The actual size of GDP in 2025 did not exceed about 45 percent of its 2010 level at constant prices. Sectoral indicators confirm this stagnation: agricultural production contracted sharply under the impact of drought and rising costs; manufacturing declined as a result of shortages of inputs, energy, and liquidity, and its exposure to imports; and the real value of government services fell as a result of austerity policies. Other sectors, such as communications and some transport, trade, and construction activities, improved relatively, but this improvement is insufficient to lead a sustainable economic recovery.

Correcting the economic trajectory requires beginning with the reconstruction of an independent and transparent national data system as a primary precondition for recovery. This requires enabling statistical institutions to produce periodic indicators that can be verified, publishing the methodologies and assumptions used in estimating GDP and macroeconomic indicators, and carrying out a comprehensive national assessment of the effects of the conflict on the population, production, capital stock, and public wealth. It also requires refraining from using exaggerated or unreliable figures in public discourse, linking economic decision-making to evidence rather than propaganda, and reviewing the policies that constrained growth, most notably: austerity, unregulated trade liberalization, rising production costs, liquidity restraint, the shrinking developmental role of the state, and the offering of public assets through non-transparent arrangements. Building confidence in the Syrian economy begins with building confidence in its data, because any discourse not supported by independent and transparent measurement will not lead to real growth, but rather to further policy distortions and an erosion of public trust.

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1. Introduction

On 20 March 2026, official media published statements containing estimates of gross domestic product that implied a return of the economy to its pre-conflict level in 2026. These statements contradict the available evidence on economic performance, both macroeconomic evidence, which shows a much slower growth trajectory, and sectoral evidence, which shows disruption or contraction in major productive sectors in 2025, in addition to the distorted environment of transitional economic governance characterized by instability, lack of transparency, weak participation, bias in favor of emerging political and economic elites, and violations of the rule of law. This has been accompanied by weak attention to the data and statistical system, which negatively affects economic and developmental estimates.

Based on a cumulative methodology that it has developed since 2012 and deepened through studies such as “Justice to Transcend Conflict,” “Confronting Fragmentation,” “Alienation and Violence,” and the study “The Impact of the Earthquake 2023,” the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimates that real GDP in 2025 barely grew (approximately 3 per thousand) compared with 2024, and that the level of GDP in 2025 does not exceed 45 percent of its level in 2010 at constant prices (SCPR, 2026a, 2026b). This policy brief reflects how GDP is independently estimated and clarifies the negative effects that have affected economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and government services) and the positive effects in sectors linked to communications and some trade and transport activities (SCPR, 2026a). In this context, the brief compares the Center’s estimates with the official statements regarding GDP. The comparison is not intended merely to present differences in numbers and indicators, but to demonstrate that the data system itself has become a direct indicator of the failure of economic governance in the transitional phase. According to United Nations principles, official statistics should be professionally independent and transparent in their sources, methodology, timing, and publication, and this is a condition for evidence-based policies and for the confidence of citizens and investors (United Nations Statistics Division, 2026). Several international bodies have pointed to the weakness of the statistical system, including the International Monetary Fund, which notes that improving statistics is part of the rehabilitation of economic institutions and the reopening of the path toward the resumption of standard assessment processes (IMF, 2026).

Exaggerated estimates dominate public debate on the Syrian economy, and they are circulated in the public sphere as a substitute for institutionally produced and verifiable measurement. The problem here lies in the fact that figures are presented as fact without a methodology, margin of error, sectoral breakdown, distinction between current and constant prices, or clarification of the exchange rate used and its effects. This is inconsistent with the basic logic of national accounts, which stresses the necessity of methodological consistency in the measurement of prices and volumes and the disclosure of methods of measurement. By contrast, World Bank estimates in its macro-fiscal assessment (June 2025) portray an economy that remains constrained by major damage to capital stock and infrastructure and by productive, financial, and trade bottlenecks. The assessment also points to the use of alternative data to overcome weaknesses in official data, which is in itself an indicator of dysfunction in the national data system (World Bank, 2025).

The core of this brief is the discussion of the claim that gross domestic product will return in 2026 to its 2010 level. This is a short period that would require, arithmetically, unprecedented growth rates (around 300 percent between 2024 and 2026) compared with what is indicated by evidence on sectoral performance and structural bottlenecks. Although a large part of the sanctions was lifted in 2025, including the removal of most economic measures on the energy, transport, and financial transfer sectors, the investment environment remains sensitive to internal factors such as security, the rule of law, contractual transparency, and the institutional capacity to implement projects.

2. Data Systems and Economic Growth

Gross domestic product is not merely a number; rather, it is the outcome of a system of measurement based on household surveys, enterprise surveys, administrative records, government accounts, trade records, energy and communications data, and more. When the data system deteriorates, GDP becomes a political number that is more vulnerable to manipulation than an economic indicator, which causes the public to lose confidence in official figures and pushes actors to use alternative indicators (a parallel exchange rate, shadow prices, unofficial estimates), thereby increasing transaction costs and expanding the opportunities for monopoly and corruption. Accordingly, the deterioration of the data system is not a side effect of the economic crisis; it is part of it and represents distorted governance of the economy (SCPR, 2026a).

3. Producing Independent Estimates during the Conflict

Since 2012, the Center has been producing independent economic and developmental estimates for Syria through multiple quantitative and qualitative methodologies, which have been used as a reference in many United Nations, World Bank, and academic reports (SCPR, 2026a). The Center's methodology for estimating GDP is based on estimating output and measuring growth at constant prices and in local currency in order to avoid the effects of price inflation, exchange-rate fluctuations, and multiple exchange rates. To construct GDP, it uses sectoral quantitative indicators (crop production, oil/gas, electricity, cement, mobile-phone minutes, port traffic) to estimate changes in real value added when comprehensive data from a single source are unavailable. In this framework, the Center relies on comprehensive coverage of the whole geography of Syria across the years of conflict, and it works to verify indicators through the use of more than one methodology, such as surveys conducted by the Center (the socioeconomic survey, or the monthly prices and wages survey) or surveys conducted by credible institutions such as food security surveys. It also produces estimates on the basis of specialized papers prepared by experts in sectors such as industry, agriculture, or energy, and relies on a team of field researchers to verify the results and measure indicators at the local level, while also employing combined qualitative and quantitative research methods to produce or validate some indicators.

It should be noted that there are many limitations related to GDP estimates. Although the Center's team seeks to reduce these limitations, they include the inability to verify quantitative data issued by public institutions, the inability to implement sufficient surveys to ensure adequate geographical and sectoral coverage, and the spread of the informal or illegal economy, for which evidence is difficult to verify. Moreover, estimates based on quantitative indicators do not accurately reflect the value added produced in sectors, especially with the changing patterns of production during the conflict, but they do provide clear indications of trends in economic performance. Therefore, the data and estimates must be read with these limitations in mind.

4. GDP in 2025 Compared with 2010

The Center estimates that real GDP in 2025 was approximately 45 percent of its level in 2010 at constant prices, and that the real growth rate in 2025 did not exceed 0.3 percent compared with 2024. In other words, GDP at constant prices in 2010 reached SYP 1,385 billion at 2000 prices, compared with about SYP 619 billion in 2025 (SCPR, 2026a). Accordingly, GDP per capita declined by about 6 percent in 2025 because of weak growth and population growth exceeding 6 percent as a result of the inflow of around 1.2 million returnees among Syrians abroad.

Figure (1): GDP Growth Rate and GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators, field surveys, and specialized papers.

4.1. Sectoral Composition

The period 2011–2025 witnessed a major change in the structural composition of GDP, as the shares of transport and communications, agriculture, utilities, non-profit institutions, and community services increased, while the shares of the remaining economic sectors declined, with the sharpest declines recorded in the shares of trade, agriculture, and government services. As a result of the overall deterioration of economic activity during the period 2011–2025, the contribution of all sectors to economic growth was negative, with the exception of transport and communications (where real growth in mobile and internet services continued to rise) and non-profit institutions (which expanded because of the inflow of humanitarian assistance and the decline of public services). In 2025, GDP witnessed a decline in the contribution of agriculture, manufacturing, finance and insurance, in addition to government services, to gross domestic product.

Figure (2): Comparison of Sectoral Contributions to Economic Growth during the Periods 2001–2010 and 2011–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

4.1.1. Agriculture

The growth rate of the agricultural sector was negative, at about 28 percent in 2025, particularly because of the severe drought wave that the country experienced, in addition to the higher costs of production inputs within the framework of policies of reducing subsidies and broad trade openness. Growth was also negative in 2024, but at a rate of 3 percent, while relatively high growth rates were achieved in 2022 and 2023 as a result of favorable rainy seasons. Accordingly, GDP in the agricultural sector in 2025 did not exceed about 46.5 percent of what it had been in 2010.

Figure (3): GDP Growth Rate in the Agricultural Sector and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

Table (1): Selected Quantitative Indicators for the Agricultural Sector

	2010	2024	2025	Growth Rate 2024/2025
Plant Production	Thousand tons			%
Wheat	3,083	2,431	922	(-62)
Barley	680	1,572	1,022	(-35)
Other cereals	253	446	501	12
Cotton	472	93	63	(-32)
Vegetables	1,708	1,933	1,814	(-6)
Fruits	1,258	606	662	9
Citrus	1,071	688	700	2

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Agricultural Statistical Yearbooks, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

4.1.2. Manufacturing

The manufacturing sector declined in 2025. Data for this sector indicate a decline in value added in 2025 of more than 10 percent compared with 2024, in which the sector achieved growth of about 6.6 percent. The size of output (value added) in 2025 was about one-fifth of what it had been in 2010.

Figure (4): GDP Growth Rate of Manufacturing and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

The suffering of manufacturing is concentrated in shortages of raw materials and skilled labor and in rising energy costs, in addition to the “flooding of the market” with cheap imported goods under the policy of “economic openness,” as well as major challenges such as the deterioration of infrastructure, weak domestic demand, and liquidity constraints. This has also been accompanied by the suspension of many state-owned industrial establishments as part of a program to convert them to private investment.

Table (2): Selected Quantitative Indicators for the Manufacturing Sector

Item	Unit	2010	2024	2025	Growth Rate 2025 / 2024 (%)
Electricity consumption of manufacturing	Billion kWh	17.7	6.66	6.28	(-5.6)
Refinery output					
Gas	Thousand tons	99	49	52	5
Diesel	Thousand tons	3,700	1,005	1,105	10
Gasoline and naphtha	Thousand tons	1,784	615	676	10
Fuel oil	Thousand tons	4,008	2,065	2,271	10

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (statistical yearbooks for various years), Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Oil and Electricity, publications of the National Energy Research Center (energy balance), the Statistical Yearbook, statistical reports of the Public Establishment for Electricity, and statements by officials of the Ministry of Energy during the OAPEC meeting in Kuwait (December 2025).

4.1.3. Oil, Gas, and Electricity

Crude oil production increased to more than 81, 85, and 89 thousand barrels/day in the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, while gas production reached 3.7, 3.3, and 3.5 billion cubic meters in the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively. Thus, extractive industry achieved a growth rate of about 4.7 percent in 2025. Despite this, the size of GDP in this sector in 2025 did not exceed 24 percent of what it had been in 2010. Electricity production also increased in 2025 to reach about 18 billion kWh, and the output of this sector thereby achieved growth of slightly more than 10 percent, while recording negative growth rates in 2023 and 2024. Despite this, the size of GDP in this sector in 2025 did not exceed 43 percent of what it had been in 2010.

Figure (5): GDP Growth Rate of Extractive Industry and Electricity and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

The agreements (memoranda of understanding) recently concluded regarding oil and gas fields and power plants and signed with international states and companies have added a degree of optimism about the future of energy production, but the absence of transparency and weak governance and accountability increase the risks of converting these agreements into rent for influential investors. The liberalization of energy prices, including the large increase in electricity prices, has also raised production costs and sharply reduced the purchasing power of citizens, thereby increasing structural pressures on economic activity.

Table (3): Quantitative Output of Oil, Gas, and Electricity

Item	Unit	2010	2024	2025	Growth Rate 2025 / 2024 (%)
Crude oil	Thousand barrels/day	386	85	89	4.7
Gas	Billion cubic meters	7.6	3.3	3.5	6.1
Electricity	Million kWh	47	17.5	18	2.9

Source: Data of the Ministry of Oil and Electricity, publications of the National Energy Research Center (energy balance), the Statistical Yearbook, statistical reports of the Public Establishment for Electricity, and statements by officials during the OAPEC meeting in Kuwait (December 2025).

4.1.4. Construction

The GDP growth rate of the construction sector was high in 2025, reaching about 48 percent. This was a direct result of the increase in the repair of housing and the construction of facilities, and output in 2025 represented about 68 percent of 2010 output. Activity in the sector was linked to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and was also affected by the security situation, the high cost of construction, and the sharp rise in real estate prices.

Figure (6): GDP Growth Rate in the Construction Sector and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

4.1.5. Transport and Communications

The growth rate of the transport and communications sector reached about 4 percent in 2025, after recording growth rates exceeding 11 percent and around 16 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Owing to the activity of communications—mobile-phone companies in particular—this was the only sector whose output in 2025 exceeded 125 percent of the sector's output in 2010.

Figure (7): GDP Growth Rate of Transport and Communications and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

Table (4): Selected Quantitative Indicators for the Transport and Communications Sector

Item	Unit	2010	2024	2025	Growth Rate 2025/2024 (%)
Postal dispatches	Thousand dispatches	7,601	695	709	2
Postal parcels	Parcel	25,442	157	159	1
Postal money orders	Thousand orders	234	215	220	3
Imports, Port of Tartous	Thousand tons	10,717	3,920	5,420	2
Exports, Port of Tartous	Thousand tons	2,732	1,193	1,126	(-6)
Imports, Port of Latakia	Thousand tons	7,305	1,927	2,795	45
Exports, Port of Latakia	Thousand tons	1,362	303	460	52
Mobile telephony	Million minutes	19,432	65,988	78,247	19

Source: Ministry of Transport, statistical yearbooks.

4.1.6. Domestic Trade

The growth rate of the trade sector exceeded 15 percent in 2025, after recording negative growth rates in most years of the period 2020–2023. Despite this, the size of the trade sector's output in 2025 still amounted to about 33 percent of what it had been in 2010. The sector dominates productive sectors in the context of economic policies that encourage trade at the expense of agricultural and industrial production.

Figure (8): GDP Growth Rate of Trade and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

4.1.7. Government Services

The GDP growth rate of government services was negative, at 4 percent in 2025, and the size of this output in that year declined to about 10 percent of what it had been in 2010. Government policies have contributed to rising prices and the deterioration of the real value of government services, including the number of employees, real wages, and spending on goods and services. The transitional government is pursuing a policy of reducing the developmental role of the state, including government services, seeking to replace it with a broader role for the private sector or civil society.

Figure (9): GDP Growth Rate of Government Services and the GDP Index Number (2010=100) over the Period 2010–2025



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

4.2. GDP from the Demand Side

In national accounts, GDP from the demand side is represented by private consumption, public consumption, investment (capital formation), and net exports. SCPR's estimates indicate that 2025 witnessed strong growth in private investment at constant prices, but public investment deteriorated sharply. Accordingly, investment accounted for about 14 percent of GDP in 2025, a share that does not reflect a reconstruction boom so much as it reflects the fragility of the capacity to expand the investment base relative to the scale of needs (SCPR, 2026a). The trade deficit also deepened in 2025 in conjunction with weak productive structures and excessive openness and trade liberalization, which made the economy more dependent on external flows (remittances and aid) to cover the trade gap, thereby exacerbating the economy's exposure to shocks and accumulating pressure on the exchange rate (SCPR, 2026a).

Figure (10): GDP by Expenditure Components for the Years 2010–2024–2025 – Billion Syrian Pounds at 2000 Prices



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research, based on sectoral quantitative indicators.

5. Causes of Weak Economic Growth

Beyond the official statements, which contained major fallacies in estimating economic performance, weak economic growth constitutes an issue of the highest gravity. Below, we discuss this political and economic issue of the transitional phase. In theory, the easing of sanctions, investment promises, and openness toward the Gulf and Western countries should raise investment and confidence, reduce the cost of finance, and increase demand. Yet reality has witnessed numerous challenges and impediments, as productive supply and effective demand deteriorated because of the policies of the transitional authority and influential factors related to the nature of the conflict and the political and security changes in the region. We briefly review some of the policies that hindered the expected growth after the fall of the Assad regime, on the understanding that they will be addressed in detail in the report “Resistance of Subjectification” which will be issued by the Center and will provide a broader developmental treatment of these issues in the context of the conflict and the transitional phase.

1) Lifting Sanctions Does Not Compensate for the Absence of the Rule of Law and Transparency

The cancellation of the Caesar Act and many American and European sanctions on economic sectors, including energy, transport, and finance, does not remove the impediments associated with Syrian institutions, such as contractual risks, the absence of transparent rules for competition and procurement, and the lack of clarity in the mechanisms for managing public assets. The literature on “growth strategies” confirms that recipes of economic liberalization do not work without meeting the binding conditions, such as the rule of law, transparency, and the availability of finance (2006; Hausmann et al.). In the transitional phase, the institutional constraint is evident, with the weakness of the path of transitional justice, abuses in the judicial system, and the severe centralization of decision-making, all of which lead to a decline in investor confidence, as investors do not guarantee their rights and do not expect equal opportunities.

2) Recurrent Violence and Forced Displacement Undermine Confidence in the Economic Process

The events of violence that followed the fall of the Assad regime directly affected the economy through the destruction or disabling of assets, forced displacement that reduces productivity, wastes resources, and increases labor and transport costs, and the increase of uncertainty and risks for investors. Examples include the coastal massacres in January–March 2025 and Sweida in July and August 2025, which involved widespread killing, displacement, looting, and the burning of homes (UN Commission of Inquiry, 2025). In neighborhoods in Aleppo and in the northeast, military operations led to the displacement of large numbers of people. Economically, these events translate into direct and indirect losses in human capital, deterioration in institutional efficiency, damage to infrastructure and property, and fragmentation of social relations, in addition to higher insurance costs, increased risk premiums, a decline in realized investment compared with promises, and investors’ preference for short-term activities (trade/real estate/monopolistic services) at the expense of long-term productive investment.

3) Concentration of Power and Dysfunction in Economic Governance

International evidence shows that post-conflict settings may turn into domination over the economy by force if legal and institutional governance preventing seizure is not available (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Moreover, the domination of armed forces or conflict elites over economic decision-making reproduces “crony capitalism,” as is evident in several descriptions of the structure of power after 2024, where Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham plays a pivotal role in the institutions of transitional governance, having established alongside the presidential palace “supra-governmental” institutions such as the sovereign fund, the Investment Commission, and

the General Authority for Border Crossings (which are governed by persons close to the transitional president), and which make strategic decisions in the distribution of wealth or the management of resources without transparency or accountability, including the non-disclosure of major confiscations or the fate of settlement funds from warlords.

4) Reducing the Developmental Role of the State and Austerity Policies

According to official statements, public finances achieved a surplus in the 2025 budget as a result of reducing subsidies on basic goods and social protection programs, lowering public investment, dismissing employees, and increasing indirect fees, rather than as a result of an expansion of the productive base (SCPR, 2026a). The state's abandonment of its responsibilities and their transfer to the private and civil sectors threaten the economic and social situation, especially as the government's narrative used the lack of resources to justify selling public assets, increasing fees, and liberalizing energy prices, while by the end of 2025 it had actually achieved a surplus, which in this case amounts to a contribution to deepening the economic and social crisis. Such austerity leads demand to contract, weakens public services (education/health/administration), increases poverty and instability, and raises production costs.

5) Liquidity Restraint

Liquidity restraint refers to the strangulation of working-capital finance for factories, farmers, productive traders, and employees, the disruption of payments, and the expansion of an unregulated cash economy (SCPR, 2026a). Liquidity restraint continued even in the context of the currency change, and was accompanied by the weakening of public and private banks and the imposition of private money-transfer companies close to the authority to serve as the compulsory financial intermediary for most Syrians, such as Sham Cash.

6) Trade Liberalization without Productive Protection

The adoption of a free economy and extreme trade liberalization has left the national product exposed to unfair external competition, with the market flooded by low-priced and low-quality goods, which has made the recovery of manufacturing and agriculture more difficult (SCPR, 2026a). The trajectory of regional trade, especially with Turkey, shows a trend toward large import flows and an influx of goods into the Syrian market, such as agricultural products or passenger cars, in a way that harms local production and diverts resources toward consumer goods. Economically, opening trade may support the availability of consumer goods and relatively reduce prices for some products, but in an economy whose production is damaged and whose competitive structure is weak, it may turn into a factor that disables productive sectors, especially if it is accompanied by high energy costs and fees and a shortage of finance.

7) Declining Rainfall and Drought

The agricultural sector declined under a severe drought wave, and climate shocks in an economy dependent on agriculture create a dual contraction in supply (production) and in demand (rural income) (SCPR, 2026b). The World Bank also points in its macro-fiscal assessment to the importance of agriculture and wheat and to production volatility, confirming that climate shocks are part of the structural constraint on the economy (World Bank, 2025).

8) Regional Dominance and Instability

Israel occupied new Syrian territories and bombed Syrian sites in continuing violations, leading to direct and indirect economic losses, with regional instability persisting, most recently the war on Iran. Regional states, especially the Gulf countries and Turkey, as well as the American and European roles, also exercise considerable influence in Syria, which threatens to impede the development of economic policies in ways that serve Syrians' priorities.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations: Data Systems at the Core of Economic Governance

The evidence of 2025 shows that the economy is trapped in a governance model that combines reckless liberalization with political centralization and replaces measurement with optimistic discourse (SCPR, 2026a). In this context, the most dangerous function of economic propaganda is not merely to mislead the public, but to reshape incentives, so that priority is given to announcements of investments, projects, and deals, rather than to restarting agriculture and industry, building banking confidence, and restoring public services. For this reason, the brief recommends, as a priority, a package of measures to re-establish the data system:

1) Strengthening the independence of official statistics in accordance with United Nations principles, within a legal framework that guarantees professionalism, an announced publication schedule, methodological transparency, and review rules.
2) Restoring the production of indicators to the state's technical institutions (statistics and planning), with governance that prevents the monopolization of data, prevents "selectivity" in indicators, and makes room for the independent production of data and indicators.
3) A conflict-impact assessment project, through integrated work that includes surveys, a census, and estimates in order to identify the actual effects of the conflict and to conduct close monitoring of the transitional phase.
4) Designing evidence-based policies by developing the decision-making process so that it is based on participation, professionalism, and transparency, including reliance on reliable evidence.
5) Finally, the official claim regarding GDP and other indicators must be placed in its context. The issue is not merely a "technical error," but an indication of distorted governance. Institutions that are unable to produce reliable data cannot manage recovery, nor can they protect society from an economy of appropriation. The Center will address public finance, employment, and inflation in subsequent briefs.

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