

POLICY BRIEF

“RECONSTRUCTION” OF GAZA AFTER THE GENOCIDE

A Critique of Projects Entrenching the
Occupation and an Entry Point for a Liberatory
Alternative

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
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Cover photo: An aerial view of the destruction in Jabalia in northern Gaza. [Mahmoud Isleem/Anadolu]. Al Jazeera.

Photo Page 6: Entire neighbourhoods have been reduced to rubble, leaving millions of people reliant on humanitarian aid for shelter and survival. [Mahmoud Isleem/Anadolu]. Al Jazeera.

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Abstract

The question of Gaza's reconstruction is being raised today within a complex local, regional, and international context, amid competition among multiple actors seeking to dominate the process, given the various forms it may take, ranging from tutelage and the reproduction of mechanisms of colonial domination to the prospect of dismantling the occupation and moving toward a liberatory alternative.

This paper examines the projects currently being proposed, how they entrench Gaza as an arena of conflict, and how they undermine the foundations needed to ensure that the reconstruction process is rooted in the Palestinians' right to self-determination and in the principles of accountability, redress, and the preservation of collective memory. Finally, the paper proposes a multidimensional liberatory alternative and discusses the prospects for its realization.

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Introduction

From Genocide to the Question of Reconstruction

For nearly eight decades, Palestinians have lived under a structure of eliminationist settler colonialism that targets both land and people through an accumulated system of direct and structural violence, from massacres, displacement, the destruction of villages and cities, and control over land, resources, crossings, and borders, to the ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords and their economic arrangements, particularly the Paris Protocol, further deepened the fragility of Palestinian political and economic structures by tying the Palestinian economy to the Israeli economy and leaving effective control over crossings, trade, and clearance revenues¹ in the hands of the occupation. This has undermined the possibility of building an independent national economy or achieving genuine national development. The Palestinian political division and conditional foreign funding have likewise contributed to weakening national planning and transforming sectors of civil society from a grassroots base for liberation into a project-based structure subject to donor conditions and securitization policies.

Since October 7, 2023, the violence in Gaza has not taken the form of a limited military assault; rather, it has assumed a genocidal character, targeting the very conditions of Palestinian existence: mass killing, displacement, starvation, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the dismantling of the foundations of everyday life. Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, cited in the draft, indicate tens of thousands of martyrs and injured people, approximately two million displaced persons, and damage to hundreds of thousands of housing units. Meanwhile, the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: Final Report, issued by the European Union, the United Nations, and the

World Bank in April 2026, estimates direct physical damage at approximately USD 35.2 billion, economic and social losses at approximately USD 22.7 billion, and recovery and reconstruction needs at approximately USD 71.4 billion, including urgent and short-term needs to restore basic services, housing, and the local economy. The assessment concludes that the scale of destruction in Gaza is fundamentally different from that seen in the wars of 2014 and 2021, and that housing, health, education, commerce, and agriculture are the sectors most severely affected (European Union, United Nations, and World Bank, 2026).

The central problem addressed by this paper is that most of the reconstruction projects currently being proposed do not proceed from Palestinians' rights to self-determination, return, compensation, and accountability. Instead, they seek to manage the consequences of the genocide through security, financial, and technocratic arrangements led or influenced by the very powers that provided the political, military, and economic cover for the continuation of the destruction. This may also lead to intervention by external powers and the imposition of colonial policies and donor agendas. Reconstruction in Gaza is therefore an arena of struggle over Palestinian political agency, over the meaning of Gaza, and over the future of its relationship with Palestine as a whole. To varying degrees, the prevailing projects carry a colonial logic that may entrench control and colonial policies, social fragmentation, environmental devastation, and economic exploitation unless they are confronted with a liberatory alternative that ensures the restoration of Palestinian decision-making power and grounds reconstruction in sovereignty, democracy, and redress.

1. Clearance revenues are funds belonging to the Palestinian Authority that are withheld by the occupation and include tax revenues, fees, and customs duties levied on goods imported into Palestine.

Reconstruction or Instruments of Domination?

Since 2000, the Gaza Strip has undergone repeated cycles of assault and destruction, beginning with the Second Intifada and the wars of 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014, followed by successive rounds of escalation between 2018 and 2023. After each war, reconstruction became a temporary and fragmented process that failed to produce sustainable recovery and instead reproduced the same conditions of vulnerability under the blockade and the occupation's control over crossings, materials, and funding. Despite successive donor conferences, from Sharm el-Sheikh in 2009 to Cairo in 2014, implementation remained limited and faltering due to unfulfilled pledges, Israeli and international monitoring mechanisms, restrictions on the entry of construction materials, and the prioritization of "Israel's security" considerations over Palestinians' rights and their housing and livelihood needs. The Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism established after 2014 transformed reconstruction into a system of administrative and security control, characterized by lengthy approval and permit procedures and prolonged waiting periods, while popular participation and civil society were excluded and priorities remained focused on managing the crisis rather than dismantling its colonial structure (Al-Samhuri, 2014; Mseif *et al.*, 2025; Stefanini, 2018).

Looking at other experiences characterized by international tutelage in the region and around the world, such as those of Lebanon and Iraq, for example, it becomes clear that the success of reconstruction depends not only on the scale of funding, but also on the nature of the authority leading the process, the logic governing the distribution of resources, and the extent to which reconstruction is linked to justice, sovereignty, and accountability. In Lebanon, recent recovery projects demonstrate the importance of a multisectoral programmatic framework that integrates the rehabilitation of

infrastructure and basic services and debris management within a clear sequencing of priorities. At the same time, however, this example shows that the existence of a functioning state does not guarantee equitable reconstruction if priorities remain governed by the logic of influence or purely technical metrics rather than social need and spatial justice. In Iraq, the post-2003 experience confirms that an abundance of resources does not produce recovery when accompanied by corruption, weak procurement systems, contractual monopolies, and declining public trust (World Bank, 2019; Schweitzer, 2017; United Nations Development Programme Iraq, 2025). Experiences of liberal peace and international tutelage in Bosnia and Haiti further indicate that formal institutions, rapid elections, the prioritization of markets, and narrow security arrangements can all produce fragile stability if they are not grounded in popular ownership, social justice, accountability for violence, and genuine sovereignty.

For Gaza, these experiences cannot serve as ready-made models to be transplanted. The Strip is not merely a space of "conflict or war," but a space of genocide, settler colonialism, and blockade. The critical conclusion that must therefore be drawn is that there can be no reconstruction without national sovereignty over every step and stage of the process; no funding without compensation and accountability; no debris management without preserving evidence of crimes and guaranteeing the right of return; and no sustainable recovery as long as crossings, materials, and decisions remain outside Palestinian control. The criteria for evaluating any reconstruction project in Gaza must include guarantees of Palestinian sovereignty and non-displacement, accountability for the genocide, community participation, social and environmental justice, and the capacity to rebuild the productive base, rather than merely the physical infrastructure.

Reconstruction Projects 2025-2026: A Comparative Critical Analysis

The latest studies and reports confirm that reconstruction projects proposed following ceasefires in protracted conflicts reopen struggles over governance, borders, resources, security, urban space, and political economy (Arafah & Turner, 2025; Ziadah, 2025). In Gaza, the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: Final Report, issued in April 2026, shifted the discussion from preliminary estimates of around USD 50 billion to needs exceeding USD 71 billion. This has intensified the interest of international, regional, and private actors in the "reconstruction market" at a moment when Palestinian sovereignty, freedom of movement, and guarantees against displacement remain matters for negotiation rather than guaranteed rights (European Union, United Nations, and World Bank, 2026). Four major projects proposed in this context warrant examination as political trajectories whose objectives and dynamics both diverge and intersect under the banner of reconstruction, and which map out the potential constellation of actors involved.

First, the US-UN track encompassing Security Council Resolution 2803, the Board of Peace, and the International Stabilization Force: This track institutionalizes the highest degree of political and security tutelage. Resolution 2803 welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace as a transitional administration with international legal personality that sets the framework for Gaza's redevelopment and coordinates funding until the Palestinian Authority has been "reformed" and is subsequently able to assume control. It also authorizes the establishment of a technocratic Palestinian committee to administer day-to-day services, albeit under the Board's supervision, and calls for the creation of a dedicated donor-governed fund and the establishment of an International Stabilization Force operating in coordination with Israel and Egypt, while linking Israeli withdrawal to benchmarks and

stages associated with demilitarization. Politically, this track reduces Palestinian society to an object of security management, denying Palestinians their right as a people to determine their own affairs; economically, it opens the way for donor funds, investment projects, and special economic zones; socially, it reclassifies the population into "manageable civilians" and "security threats"; and environmentally, it risks turning rubble and land into instruments for reorganizing urban space according to security and investment considerations rather than the rights to return, housing, and memory (United Nations Security Council, 2025).

Second, Egypt's plan, or the Arab Plan for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development: The Arab plan endorsed at the Cairo meeting in March 2025 presented itself as an alternative to the discourse of a "Gaza Riviera" and displacement, emphasizing that Palestinians should remain on their land, "Palestinian ownership," the restoration of basic services, the rebuilding of infrastructure, and a phased transition from relief to recovery and development. However, its strengths at the level of principle do not eliminate its political shortcomings. It relies on an official Palestinian administration despite widespread Israeli rejection of any substantive role for the Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, questions of security, crossings, and weapons remain contingent on uncertain regional and international arrangements. Some of its economic visions, including ports, commercial zones, technology, and tourism, could also become a development façade unless accompanied by binding guarantees of sovereignty and rights against displacement and the continued Israeli control of borders and resources (Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Washington, DC, 2025; Reuters, 2025; The Guardian, 2025).

Third, the official Palestinian program, or the Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Program: In October 2025, the Palestinian government announced a five-year framework with an estimated value of USD 67 billion, covering 56 subprograms across 18 sectors and divided into

The threat of "disaster capitalism" in Gaza is no longer merely theoretical.

phases beginning with a six-month emergency plan of approximately USD 3.5 billion, followed by a USD 30 billion reconstruction and recovery phase, and then a long-term phase for completing reconstruction. The strength of this track lies in its reaffirmation of Gaza as an open and connected part of the State of Palestine and in linking reconstruction to national institutions and the Arab plan. Its vulnerability, however, lies in its dependence on the effective empowerment of the Palestinian Authority, the opening of crossings, the withdrawal of the occupation, and the release of funding, all of which are conditions that the Authority alone cannot guarantee. Any official Palestinian program will remain at risk of reproducing the Oslo bureaucracy unless it is accompanied by democratic reform, community participation, independent accountability, and an explicit rejection of turning reconstruction into an instrument of securitization or conditional funding (WAFA, 2025; Anadolu Agency, 2025; Reuters, 2025).

Fourth, Gaza Phoenix: This framework offers the approach closest to a liberatory alternative, as it proceeds from local knowledge, spatial planning, memory, environmental justice, and national community participation. Its methodology is based on three interconnected phases: emergency, stabilization, and long-term reconstruction. It rejects top-down plans and extractive consultation practices, emphasizing that reconstruction is not a process of technical recovery but a political, cultural, and existential process. Yet despite its progressive approach, this framework is insufficient on its own if it remains confined to a technical or local methodology. Its true value emerges when it is integrated into a Palestinian national charter that guarantees sovereignty, compensation, accountability, and the unity of Gaza and the West Bank, and prevents national community participation from being turned into a participatory façade within a system of external tutelage (Union of Gaza Strip Municipalities, 2025; Abdelwahab, 2025).

A comparative reading of these tracks reveals that the core disagreement concerns neither construction techniques nor the scale of funding, but rather who holds decision-making power, the motivations and objectives behind controlling, and even monopolizing, it. This also entails excluding certain actors and politically instrumentalizing others in ways that create the conditions for the dominance or ascendancy of a particular track. The US track prioritizes security, demilitarization, and attracting investment over rights and sovereignty; the Arab plan seeks to prevent displacement but remains at risk of being subsumed within the US framework unless it secures guarantees of sovereignty; the official Palestinian program could provide an entry point for restoring national leadership if it is subject to reform, participation, and oversight, or it could become a conditional bureaucracy; while Gaza Phoenix offers a local, participatory horizon but requires a national political vehicle.

The threat of "disaster capitalism" in Gaza is no longer merely theoretical. Numerous discussions and papers have warned that "day after" plans could strip Palestinians of their agency and open the way for turning destruction into an opportunity to reorder land, population, and resources for the benefit of political, financial, and consultancy elites. Other researchers, meanwhile, have argued that the emerging reconstruction regime could operate as a continuation of the logic of colonial erasure through three pathways: the absence of self-determination, the reordering of space, and the erasure of social life in its multiple dimensions. The "development as erasure" approach emphasizes that reconstruction can become an extension of war if rebuilding is separated from decolonization, compensation, and accountability (Arafah & Turner, 2025; Baghdadi, 2025; Ziadah, 2025).

The Liberatory Alternative: Toward a Sovereign, Democratic, and Reparative Model for Gaza and Palestine

The liberatory alternative is grounded in real power dynamics taking shape at this critical juncture. These include the overwhelming Palestinian, Arab, and international outrage at the horror of the genocide, which is generating pressure that extends beyond technocratic arrangements and creates a moral and political imperative to prevent its recurrence, given the grave global and humanitarian risks posed by this genocide. This vision also intersects with the aspirations of certain regional and international powers, particularly European, Gulf, and Egyptian actors, to achieve sustainable stability and secure resources in the region, opening up room for maneuver within the region's shifting dynamics. Finally, the growing political resistance to the policies of the "Trump-Netanyahu" alliance is emerging as a key source of leverage that rejects political liquidation. It draws on Palestinians' resilience and exceptional capacity to act under impossible conditions, rooted in their existential connection to land and identity. Reconstruction thus becomes not merely a set of technical building projects, but a political act of resistance through which initiative and decision-making power are reclaimed.

The alternative cannot be reduced to improving coordination among donors or establishing a new financing fund. Gaza's reconstruction is taking place in a context of genocide, settler colonialism, blockade, potential international tutelage, and Palestinian division. The alternative model therefore assumes that reconstruction is a political struggle over sovereignty, memory, the right of return, and economic decision-making. This model is based on the following pillars:

1. Sovereignty and ending tutelage as a precondition for reconstruction: Liberation from occupation is not a distant outcome of reconstruction, but its first precondition. Any plan that leaves crossings, materials, funding, security, and the movement of people outside Palestinian control will reproduce the blockade, even under a humanitarian or technocratic guise. Projects based on tutelage, build-operate-transfer models, and arrangements that defer sovereignty and turn Gaza into a zone under international administration or an investment market must therefore be rejected.

2. Political reconstruction and building democratic legitimacy: Gaza cannot be rebuilt through unaccountable institutions or under a divided Palestinian leadership or one imposed from outside. The alternative requires a broad Palestinian national dialogue encompassing political forces, municipalities, trade unions, civil society, universities, women, youth, and the diaspora, and establishing a political charter for reconstruction that rejects tutelage, displacement, and the stripping away of sovereignty; guarantees the unity of Gaza and the West Bank; and rebuilds public legitimacy on the basis of pluralism, rights, and accountability.

3. A transitional Palestinian reconstruction authority: This phase requires the establishment of a transitional Palestinian authority with a time-limited mandate to lead the reconstruction process in accordance with a national agreement. It should include balanced representation from municipalities and local councils, public institutions, civil society organizations, trade unions, professional associations, universities, and Palestinian experts in the diaspora. The authority should be subject to a code of conduct, transparent governance rules, independent auditing, a community complaints mechanism, and a national matrix for assessing every reconstruction project from the perspectives of sovereignty, social justice, environmental impact, non-displacement, and accountability.

4. Transforming relief into sustainable development pathways: The emergency response should not be separated from long-term planning. Reconstruction should begin with the conditions necessary for survival and return, including housing, water and sanitation, electricity, health, education, transport, and municipal services. The removal of rubble and hazardous waste should be undertaken as part of a public works program rather than treated as an isolated engineering matter. This process should also be managed in a manner that preserves evidence related to war crimes and genocide. Priority should be given to rebuilding universities, cultural centers, archives, and institutions of collective memory, because a society emerging from genocide needs institutions for reflection, organization, and care.

5. A solidarity-based, green economy instead of a real estate and contracting economy: The economic alternative needs to break with the logic of a "Gaza Riviera", large-scale real estate projects, and an economy based on concessions and privileges. What is needed is a social and ecological economy that creates employment on a broad scale and rebuilds the local productive base: agriculture, fishing, small workshops, cooperatives, artisanal industries, decentralized renewable energy, recycling, public transport, and the care economy. This model not only addresses poverty, but also reduces dependence on donors and external markets and establishes a material foundation for sovereignty and resilience.

6. Reparative financing and accountability: Reconstruction financing must be treated as a right to reparations rather than as a grant or loan, with the primary financial burden borne by the occupation and by the states, companies, and other actors complicit in the genocide, through international compensation mechanisms, reparation funds, legal action, the restoration of Palestinian financial flows, diaspora contributions, as well as environmental and climate finance wherever possible. Reconstruction without compensation and accountability turns a right into charity and entrenches impunity.

7. Civil society and municipalities as channels of leadership and accountability: Civil society should not merely implement donor projects, but should be a partner in setting priorities, monitoring funding, protecting rights, documenting violations, and ensuring the inclusion of the groups most severely affected. Municipalities and local councils, despite the destruction of their capacities, constitute an essential entry point for rebuilding everyday services and community accountability, provided they are supported without being reduced to implementing bodies deprived of decision-making power.

The alternative model cannot be reduced to improving coordination among donors or establishing a new financing fund. Gaza's reconstruction is taking place in a context of genocide, settler colonialism, blockade, potential international tutelage, and Palestinian division.

The following are some policy recommendations:

Liberatory reconstruction requires the adoption of a Palestinian national charter that serves as the political and rights-based reference framework for every intervention, source of funding, and project. It should clearly set out the rejection of displacement, tutelage, rent-seeking privatization, and the subjection of crossings and resources to external security arrangements, while linking reconstruction to the rights of return, redress, and accountability. This measure is feasible if led by Palestinian institutions and political forces in cooperation with municipalities, trade unions, universities, civil society organizations, and the diaspora, drawing on the broad popular consensus against displacement and international rights-based advocacy. The main obstacle, however, lies in US and Israeli pressure and the conditions imposed by some donors, which may seek to advance arrangements that appear technically neutral but strip Palestinians of political decision-making power. A sovereignty-based matrix should therefore be adopted to assess every project according to its impact on the right of return, non-displacement, Palestinian control over resources, and the preservation of memory and property.

The alternative requires the establishment of a transitional Palestinian reconstruction authority with a time-limited mandate. It should not serve as a substitute for national political representation, but rather as an executive and institutional mechanism for coordinating planning, financing, and oversight. The authority could include municipalities, technical ministries, professional associations, universities, civil society organizations, organizations representing women and persons with disabilities, and Palestinian experts from Gaza and the diaspora. It should be subject to independent auditing and periodically publish contracts, financial reports, implementation rates, and complaints. The

feasibility of this track rests on the practical need for a clear Palestinian coordination mechanism and the availability of extensive technical and community expertise, while its risks include potential capture by the executive authority, donors, or contracting networks. Conflicts of interest must therefore be prevented, members of the authority must be prohibited from benefiting from reconstruction contracts, and the authority must be required to hold public accountability hearings and maintain a community complaints mechanism.

Reconstruction financing must be transformed from conditional aid or new loans into a reparative, rights-based process grounded in the responsibility of Israel and of the states and companies complicit in the genocide and destruction. This requires establishing a national registry of individual and collective damage and losses and linking it to legal cases seeking compensation before available international and national courts and mechanisms, while rejecting financing arrangements that encumber public assets or transfer decision-making power to investors through long-term contracts. This approach draws on international damage assessments, the growing body of human rights evidence, and solidarity and boycott campaigns, but it will face significant obstacles, including political protection for Israel, the US veto, donor reluctance, and banking restrictions. A distinction must therefore be maintained between accepting urgent humanitarian funding and relinquishing the right to compensation and accountability.

Rubble and hazardous waste must be treated as a political, environmental, and rights-based issue, rather than merely an engineering task. A national public works program could be launched to remove rubble, unexploded ordnance, and hazardous waste, while providing income and employment opportunities for affected families, youth, and women who are primary breadwinners, and

involving municipalities, civil defense, environmental and forensic experts, human rights institutions, and specialized UN agencies. The strength of this option lies in combining physical recovery, social protection, and the preservation of evidence of war crimes, while its risks include restrictions on the entry of equipment and fuel, the danger posed by unexploded ordnance, and the possibility of external companies taking control of rubble management as a source of profit. The privatization of this sector should therefore be prohibited, and any external intervention should be subject to municipal and Palestinian leadership and to protocols for preserving evidence, property, and spatial memory.

Housing, return, and the rebuilding of neighborhoods should be the priority of reconstruction, rather than large-scale real estate projects or isolated economic zones. This entails establishing participatory neighborhood committees to identify residents' needs, updating property records, protecting those who have lost their documentation, and developing temporary housing solutions that do not become permanent displacement or the forced redistribution of the population. This approach is grounded in people's attachment to their neighborhoods and land and in the capacity of municipalities and local communities to identify actual priorities. However, it will face obstacles such as occupation plans or policies, buffer zones, investor pressure, real estate speculation, and the loss of documentation. Property and housing rights must therefore be legally protected, the sale of land under the pressure of need must be prevented, and priority must be given to rebuilding neighborhoods as integrated social and service units encompassing housing, schools, clinics, water, and electricity.

Economic recovery requires linking relief to local production rather than entrenching an economy of permanent import dependence and consumption. This can be achieved by establishing clear local procurement requirements in relief and reconstruction contracts; supporting agriculture, fishing, small workshops, food and artisanal industries, and cooperatives; and employing local workers in reconstruction and service provision. The feasibility of this approach rests on Gaza's extensive productive skills, social solidarity networks, and experience in economic adaptation, while it is constrained by control over the crossings, the destruction of agricultural land, shortages of energy and raw materials, and the dominance of major suppliers and external supply chains. A minimum local-content requirement should therefore be imposed on every project, the shares of local employment and procurement should be published, and funding should be tied to its capacity to generate income and production rather than merely distribute aid.

A social and ecological economy should be built around cooperatives, care, decentralized energy, recycling, and small-scale public utilities, rather than large-scale real estate and contracting. This includes financing women's and youth cooperatives; supporting solar energy projects for schools, health centers, and water facilities; establishing units to recycle reusable materials; funding childcare and eldercare centers; protecting survivors of violence; and strengthening funding for rehabilitation centers for persons with disabilities and ensuring that their needs are met. The strength of this approach lies in its responsiveness to genuine everyday needs and its ability to reduce dependence on centralized systems and donors. However, it may be hindered by other factors, namely the dominance of the large-scale contracting model, the limited recognition of the care economy, and attempts to turn green financing into a technical façade devoid of social justice. Any environmental or climate financing must therefore be tied to criteria of community ownership, justice, and local employment.

An independent national observatory for donors, contracts, and international interventions must be established, as disaster capitalism thrives in the absence of transparency. The observatory would track funding sources, political conditions, contracts, implementing entities, ultimate beneficiaries, conflicts of interest, and the social and environmental impacts of projects, and would publish an open database in Arabic and English. It could be managed by a network of research institutions, universities, trade unions, human rights organizations, and investigative journalists, drawing on broad public demand for oversight and transparency regarding the flow of resources. This approach, however, will face resistance from companies, donors, and local elites that may refuse to disclose contracts or conditions. A minimum level of disclosure should therefore be made a condition of any contract or funding arrangement, alongside the establishment of a complaints mechanism and protections for whistleblowers reporting corruption and exploitation.

The groups most severely affected must be integrated into the core of planning, implementation, and oversight, rather than treated as marginal beneficiary groups. These include women, children, persons with disabilities, older persons, breadwinning families, the injured, displaced persons, and informal workers. This can be achieved through social impact assessments for every project, simplified registration channels for those who have lost their documentation, mandatory representation of these groups on neighborhood and oversight committees, and funding for care and psychosocial services as part of the infrastructure. The feasibility of this approach is supported by the presence of experienced feminist, human rights, and community organizations, while obstacles include patriarchal tendencies in

resource distribution, the control exercised by local intermediaries, the politicization of aid, and the prioritization of visible physical projects over care. Financial disbursements should therefore be tied to evidence that housing, services, and income are reaching the groups most severely affected.

The Palestinian alternative requires an international alliance for accountability rather than tutelage, so that solidarity is not reduced to the provision of depoliticized humanitarian aid. This alliance should include trade unions, universities, municipalities, feminist, environmental, and labor movements, human rights organizations, Global South networks, and boycott and divestment initiatives. It could exert pressure toward three interconnected demands: ending complicity, financing reparations, and holding accountable the companies and states involved in the genocide or benefiting from rent-seeking reconstruction contracts. The strength of this approach lies in the breadth of global solidarity with Palestine and the growing exposure of international double standards, while its obstacles include the criminalization of solidarity, political and media pressure, accusations of antisemitism, and attempts to separate reconstruction from accountability. A clear rights-based discourse must therefore be developed that links reconstruction to international law, opposition to apartheid, redress, and social justice.

Conclusion

The liberatory alternative for Gaza's reconstruction is based on transforming reconstruction from an instrument for managing the consequences of genocide into a process for dismantling the conditions that made it possible. It is a sovereign model because it rejects tutelage and external control; democratic because it restores decision-making power to Palestinians through participatory and accountable institutions; reparative because it treats financing as a right to redress rather than as conditional aid; and social and ecological because it proceeds from people's everyday needs and from restoring the conditions for life, work, and care, rather than from real estate speculation and large-scale contracts.

In this sense, the reconstruction of Gaza is not merely about rebuilding what has been destroyed, but about rebuilding the Palestinian collective capacity to survive, organize, demand liberation, and shape a just political future for Gaza, the West Bank, and Palestine.

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