Apparent Price Contraction amid Supply Disruptions, Growing Trade Exposure, and Banking-Sector Transformations

Monthly Bulletin for Consumer Price Index and Inflation in Syria

Issue (7) – July 2026

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Executive Summary

Syria's Consumer Price Index (CPI) declined by 1.9 per cent in July 2026 compared with June, falling from 1010 to 991 points. This decline reflected lower prices in five consumption groups, most notably tobacco, transport, housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, and food and non-alcoholic beverages, against increases in six groups. The decline did not, however, represent a general improvement in living conditions: the overall price level remained 24.8 per cent higher than in July 2025 and was nearly ten times its level in the 2021 base year.

July was marked by a widening gap between official prices and the actual cost of obtaining goods and services. Lower official prices for some petroleum products and the appreciation of the SYP helped reduce the transport and energy indices. However, persistent supply shortages, congestion at fuel stations and high black-market prices limited the extent to which these declines translated into lower transport, production and service costs. Al-Hasakeh provided the clearest example, as shortages of subsidised diesel for public services continued to disrupt generators, bakeries, mills, water stations and local transport.

The month also revealed a clear divergence between falling prices for pulses, vegetables and some imported goods, on the one hand, and rising prices for meat, milk and dairy products, on the other. This suggests that food-price deflation was driven mainly by seasonal factors or lower prices for certain imports, rather than by a structural improvement in food security or household purchasing power.

The decline in the transport and energy indices did not reflect genuine stability in the fuel market. Repeated adjustments to official prices coincided with persistent supply shortages, congestion at fuel stations and high black-market prices. The effects were particularly severe in Al-Hasakeh, where shortages of subsidised diesel for public services disrupted generators, bakeries, mills, water stations and local transport, limiting the effect of official price reductions on production and service costs.

On the monetary front, the Syrian Pound (SYP) appreciated in the parallel market: the average United States Dollar (USD) exchange rate fell from approximately SYP 14001 in June to SYP 13215 in July, while the official rate remained at SYP 12250, narrowing the gap between the two rates to about 7.9 per cent. Nevertheless, the stronger exchange rate did not eliminate price disparities across governorates, particularly in transport, housing and energy, where prices remained closely linked to fuel availability, pricing arrangements and local operating costs.

List of contents

List of tables

List of charts

Apparent Price Contraction amid Supply Disruptions, Growing Trade Exposure, and Banking-Sector Transformations

1. Consumer Price Bulletin: Methodology and Scope of Coverage

This bulletin provides an independent assessment of consumer-price and inflation developments across Syria's governorates, based on a monthly survey conducted regularly by the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) since October 2020. SCPR developed the survey methodology with reference to the concepts and standards set out in the International Labour Organization's Consumer Price Index Manual. The survey measures changes in the prices of a reference basket comprising 112 goods and services, classified according to the Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). The basket represents approximately 78 per cent of total household consumption expenditure, according to the 2009 Household Income and Expenditure Survey. SCPR reconstructed the basket weights using the multipurpose surveys it conducted in 2020, together with a range of primary and secondary data. This process took account of changes in household consumption patterns during the conflict, as well as differences among governorates and local economies. Accordingly, the basket includes alternative sources of energy and water, goods sold at market prices, private university education and other items that have come to account for a growing share of household expenditure.

The survey covers 58 markets, including 25 in governorate centres and 33 outside them. These urban and rural locations were selected on the basis of population size, commercial activity, geographical distribution and social diversity. Data are collected by 35 field researchers residing in the areas covered, through regular visits undertaken during the fourth week of each month. The data are audited and cross-checked at the item, market and governorate levels. Quality-control procedures include verifying that specifications remain constant, reviewing outliers, and addressing unavailable items or changes in quality. When a seasonal item is temporarily unavailable, its price movement is estimated using similar items or the closest group, in accordance with the approved substitution and imputation rules, until direct price observation resumes.

In addition to the prices of goods and services, the survey monitors the monthly wages of eight reference occupational categories: public-sector employees with university and basic-education qualifications; a university professor; a retail-shop worker; a company manager; a university-educated employee and a maintenance worker in a civil society organisation; and a daily worker. These wages are observed in the 58 markets covered by the survey, allowing monthly changes and disparities across regions and sectors to be tracked, as well as the capacity of a single wage to cover the living costs and price-updated poverty lines of the reference household.

The CPI is calculated using the estimated 2020 consumption weights, with 2021 prices taken as the base. Price indices for goods and services are then aggregated progressively across groups, markets and governorates to produce the overall CPI for Syria. The results are used to measure inflation, analyse geographical and sectoral disparities, estimate living costs and poverty lines, and monitor the purchasing power of wages. Further details on the calculation formula, weights, aggregation and substitution mechanisms, and quality control are provided in [the SCPR Consumer Price Index Manual for Syria (2022).]

2. Economic Context and Price Drivers in July 2026

Disruption in the fuel market dominated Syria's economic and social landscape in July 2026. Successive price adjustments coincided with persistent supply shortages and congestion at fuel stations, affecting transport, electricity, productive activity and essential services. Following reductions in petrol and diesel prices at the end of June, prices rose again on 16 July by between 11.5 and 12.1 per cent, before being revised once more on 24 and 28 July. By the end of the month, prices stood at SYP 14.7 thousand per litre for 95-octane petrol, SYP 14.2 thousand for 90-octane petrol and SYP 12 thousand for diesel. A household gas cylinder cost SYP 147 thousand, while an industrial gas cylinder cost SYP 235 thousand. Despite the limited reduction at the end of the month, fuel remained scarce, demonstrating that the official price alone did not determine the actual cost. Access continued to depend on availability, waiting time and the black market, all of which raised transport and production costs even when official prices declined. On 30 July, the price of a tonne of industrial fuel oil was reduced from USD 475 to USD 400, or by 15.8 per cent, with the aim of easing production costs. The impact of this decision, however, remained contingent on reliable supply and on firms' ability to translate lower costs into higher output or lower prices.

In areas under the Autonomous Administration (AA), the crisis took on a more acute service-delivery dimension, particularly in Al-Hasakeh. Although the price of diesel allocated to public services remained fixed at SYP 125 per litre, available quantities were insufficient to operate generators, bakeries, mills, water stations and local transport. Some subscription generators in Al-Hasakeh city ceased operating in mid-July, while those that continued received about 220 litres per day—enough for no more than eight hours of operation. Sixteen tankers were allocated to cover service needs across a wide geographical area, even though Al-Hasakeh city alone has approximately 500 subscription generators. This illustrates the scale of the gap between available supply and demand and explains why the crisis extended to electricity, water, bread production and local transport.

Alongside the energy crisis, foreign-trade data pointed to the Syrian market's growing dependence on imports from Türkiye and China. Turkish exports to Syria increased by 26.4 per cent year on year in the first half of 2026, reaching approximately USD 1.285 billion, while export volumes rose by 36.6 per cent to more than 3.18 million tonnes. Milling products topped the list, followed by cement and electrical and energy products. Chinese exports to Syria amounted to approximately USD 669.9 million during the first half of 2026, exceeding the USD 668.1 million recorded for the whole of 2025 (General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, 2026).

These figures indicate growing trade exposure, which may intensify pressure on domestic agriculture and industry amid energy shortages, weak financing, high transport costs and the absence of effective instruments to safeguard fair competition and support local production (World Bank, 2025; FAO, 2025).

On the monetary and banking front, July saw the approach of the 30 July deadline for exchanging old Syrian banknote denominations and withdrawing them from circulation. The process was particularly important in Deir-Ezzor, Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh because of the distance to banking outlets, the fragmentation of areas of control and the widespread reliance on cash transactions.

On 29 July, the Central Bank of Syria opened an official account with the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye, with the aim of facilitating trade-related payments and settlements between the two countries and strengthening technical and banking cooperation. This step may broaden formal payment channels and reduce some transfer costs. At the same time, however, it reflects the Syrian economy's growing integration with Türkiye amid rising imports and the circulation of the Turkish Lira (TL) in parts of northern Syria. The agreement should therefore be assessed according to its capacity to serve Syrian trade and production, rather than merely facilitate import financing.

In parallel, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited Syria between 19 and 23 July to discuss public finances, the monetary and banking sectors, reform priorities and statistical capacity-building. The IMF statement reported an expansion in economic activity, driven by population returns and the resumption of some activities, and projected double-digit growth despite acknowledging persistent and substantial data gaps. This estimate warrants caution: growth may reflect a rebound from a severely depressed base or an expansion in trade, services and imports without implying the restoration of agricultural, industrial or infrastructure capacity, or an improvement in living standards. Nor did the statement provide sufficiently detailed data or methodology to permit independent scrutiny of the estimate (International Monetary Fund, 4 August 2026). This qualification is particularly important in the context of prices, since output growth or trade expansion may coexist with a rising cost of living, weak wages and deteriorating services. Growth indicators should therefore be assessed alongside price, poverty and wage indicators rather than in isolation.

This reservation intersects with the criticism presented by the Syrian Initiative for Fundamental Rights regarding the return of the IMF and World Bank to work in Syria. The initiative warned against reducing policy evaluation to aggregate indicators, such as growth, monetary stability, and financial balance, without examining the distribution of benefits and costs between groups, sectors, and regions. Financial indicators may improve as a result of reducing support, spending, and public investment, or shifting the burdens of adaptation to families and producers, while real wages remain low and public services decline, and productive sectors face high costs, lack of financing, weak demand, and intense competition with imports. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the recovery of some activities from low levels and an inclusive and sustainable economic recovery. The growth rate of output alone does not reveal the sources of growth, its distribution, or its ability to create job opportunities and improve wages and services. (Syrian Initiative for Fundamental Rights, 2026)

Humanitarian indicators confirm the importance of this distinction. UNICEF estimated that about 15.6 million people were in need of some form of assistance in mid-2026, with the risk of some services being reduced as a result of a lack of funding. In this context, July combined fuel price increases, supply disruptions, expanding trade exposure to Türkiye and China, growing financial ties to Turkey, and the return of international financial institutions. However, these movements have not yet translated into a tangible improvement in the lives of the majority of Syrians, who continue to face low incomes, high transport and energy costs, and poor basic services (UNICEF, 2026; International Monetary Fund, 2026).

Accordingly, the main developments in July operated through four price channels: supply conditions, particularly for fuel; exposure to Turkish and Chinese imports; payments and transfers associated with the new account at the Turkish central bank and the exchange of old banknotes; and expectations surrounding the return of international financial institutions. Their effects are reflected not only in the CPI, but also in the actual cost of obtaining goods and services and in the ability of wages to keep pace with prices.

3. Year-on-Year (Y-o-Y) Inflation in Syria

The CPI recorded Y-o-Y inflation of 24.8 per cent in July 2026, compared with approximately 40.5 per cent in June and 39.9 per cent in May. This decline was partly attributable to a high base effect, as July 2025 witnessed a severe inflationary shock following the events in As-Sweida and the associated disruption to transport and supply chains. The lower Y-o-Y inflation rate in July 2026 therefore does not necessarily indicate a comparable easing in current cost-of-living pressures; it also reflects comparison with an exceptional month in the previous year (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2025). The overall price level remained about 24.8 per cent higher than one year earlier, while the consumption basket cost nearly ten times as much as in the 2021 base year.

Figure (1): Consumer Price Index in Syria during the period (July 2025 - July 2026), (base year 2021 = 100)



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2025 and 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels recorded the highest Y-o-Y inflation rate in July 2026. Its CPI rose from 1355 points in July 2025 to 1855 points in July 2026, an annual increase of 36.9 per cent. This rise demonstrates the continuing concentration of price pressures in essential expenditure, particularly rent, water, electricity, gas and household energy. The group also retained the highest index level among all consumption groups, at more than 18 times its 2021 base-year level.

Table (1): Annual consumer price inflation in Syria for July 2026 by consumption groups, (base year 2021 = 100) and (inflation in percentages)

#	Group	CPI, July 2025	CPI, July 2026	Y-o-Y inflation
	All commodities	794	991	24.8%
1	Food and Beverages	565	681	20.5%
2	Tobacco	485	620	27.8%
3	Clothes and Shoes	597	686	14.8%
4	Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and fuel	1,355	1,855	36.9%
5	Household equipments and maintenance	453	593	31.0%
6	Health	752	852	13.3%
7	Transportation	1,217	1,075	-11.7%
8	Communications	208	202	-2.7%
9	Entertainment and Culture	483	506	4.8%
10	Education	757	1,009	33.3%
11+12	Various goods and services	730	976	33.7%

Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

Miscellaneous goods and services ranked second, with Y-o-Y inflation of 33.7 per cent as its index rose from 730 to 976 points. Education followed at 33.3 per cent, with its index increasing from 757 to 1009 points, reflecting the growing burden of education-related services and needs. Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance also recorded Y-o-Y inflation of 31.0 per cent, as its index rose from 453 to 593 points, indicating the continuing increase in the cost of household equipment and housing repairs and maintenance.

Tobacco prices rose by 27.8 per cent Y-o-Y, as the group's index increased from 485 to 620 points. The index for food and non-alcoholic beverages rose from 565 to 681 points, representing Y-o-Y inflation of 20.5 per cent. Clothing and footwear recorded Y-o-Y inflation of 14.8 per cent, with its index increasing from 597 to 686 points, while health prices rose by 13.3 per cent as the index increased from 752 to 852 points. Recreation and culture recorded a comparatively limited increase of 4.8 per cent, with its index rising from 483 to 507 points.

By contrast, transport and communications recorded Y-o-Y deflation. The transport index fell from 1,217 points in July 2025 to 1,075 points in July 2026, a decline of 11.7 per cent. This largely reflected the high comparison base created by the exceptional price shock in July 2025 following the events in As-Sweida, which disrupted transport and supply flows and increased the cost of moving people and goods (Syrian Center for Policy Research, 2025).

4. Month-on-Month (M-o-M) Inflation in Syria

The CPI recorded M-o-M deflation of 1.9 per cent in July 2026, falling from 1,010 points in June to 991 points, with 2021 as the base year. This decline reflected lower prices in five consumption groups, against increases in six groups. Lower prices for pulses, vegetables and some imported goods contributed to this movement, alongside declines in the official prices of certain petroleum products after their denomination in SYP. Price movements were not uniform, however: meat prices increased, particularly chicken, while black-market fuel prices remained high because of repeated shortages and the difficulty of obtaining fuel at official prices.

Tobacco recorded the largest M-o-M decline among the groups, at 7.6 per cent, as its index fell from 671 to 620 points. Transport ranked second, with its index declining from 1112 to 1075 points, or 3.3 per cent, partly reflecting lower official fuel prices. This decline did not translate proportionately into actual transport costs, however, given continuing petrol shortages, high black-market prices and the hours some drivers spent waiting for fuel, which kept operating costs above the level suggested by official prices.

The index for housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels declined from 1,905 to 1,855 points, recording M-o-M deflation of 2.6 per cent, partly associated with lower official prices for some energy sources. Nevertheless, the group retained the highest index level among the main groups, reflecting the continuing burden of housing and energy costs on households.

The food and non-alcoholic beverages index declined from 690 to 681 points, or 1.3 per cent. The decrease was driven by lower prices for pulses, vegetables and several imported food products, which offset higher meat, milk and dairy prices, particularly chicken and local cheese.

Recreation and culture also declined, with its index remaining at 507 points after rounding and recording limited deflation of 0.1 per cent, influenced by lower prices for some imported and exchange-rate-sensitive goods. By contrast, clothing and footwear rose from 683 to 686 points, or 0.4 per cent—a movement closer to stability than to a material increase in the group's costs.

Miscellaneous goods and services recorded the largest M-o-M increase, at 2.5 per cent, as its index rose from 952 to 976 points. The health index increased from 844 to 852 points, or 0.9 per cent, indicating continuing pressure on health-care costs despite the general decline in prices. Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance rose by 0.8 per cent, from 588 to 593 points, while education rose by 1.0 per cent, from 998 to 1,009 points. Communications increased by 0.5 per cent, bringing its rounded index to 203 points in July.

Overall, M-o-M deflation of 1.9 per cent reflected lower prices for a number of goods, particularly pulses, vegetables and some imported goods, together with the effect of lower official prices for certain petroleum products. It nevertheless concealed important disparities among basket components and between official prices and the actual cost of obtaining goods and services: meat prices, especially chicken, increased, and the gap between official and black-market fuel prices persisted during periods of shortage. The fall in the index therefore did not represent a general and uniform improvement in living conditions, particularly as the overall price level remained 24.8 per cent higher than in July 2025 and nearly ten times its 2021 base-year level, alongside continuing high housing, energy, food, education and health costs and the inability of incomes to keep pace. July thus reveals a form of “socially unsecured deflation": lower price indicators do not necessarily improve household welfare while fuel and essential services must still be obtained through queues, black markets or additional transport costs.

Table 2: M-o-M Consumer Price Inflation in Syria in July 2026, by Consumption Group (2021 = 100; inflation in per cent)

#	Group	CPI, June 2026	CPI, July 2026	M-o-M inflation
	All commodities	**1,010**	**991**	**-1.9%**
1	Food and Beverages	**690**	**681**	**-1.3%**
2	Tobacco	**671**	**620**	**-7.6%**
3	Clothes and Shoes	**683**	**686**	**0.4%**
4	Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and fuel	**1,905**	**1,855**	**-2.6%**
5	Household equipments and maintenance	**588**	**593**	**0.8%**
6	Health	**844**	**852**	**0.9%**
7	Transportation	**1,112**	**1,075**	**-3.3%**
8	Communications	**201**	**202**	**0.5%**
9	Entertainment and Culture	**507**	**506**	**-0.1%**
10	Education	**998**	**1,009**	**1.0%**
11+12	Various goods and services	**952**	**976**	**2.5%**

Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

4.1. Monthly Change by Consumption Group

The following analysis examines the principal goods and service groups whose price indices changed materially in July 2026, based on a comparison with the preceding month, June.

4.1.1. Tobacco

Tobacco recorded M-o-M deflation of 7.6 per cent in July 2026, as its index for Syria declined from approximately 671 points in June to 620 points in July. Despite this decrease, tobacco prices remained approximately 6.2 times their level in the 2021 base year.

The contraction was driven primarily by lower prices for domestically produced cigarettes. The average price of a packet of long Hamra cigarettes fell by 12 per cent, from approximately SYP 11500 in June to SYP 10200 in July. The decline was smaller for imported cigarettes: the average price of a packet of yellow Gauloises fell by 2 per cent, from about SYP 12500 to SYP 12200.

The July decline followed price increases in May and June, which coincided with an increase in the consumer spending tax on imported tobacco and tobacco products from 5 to 20 per cent. The decline may have been associated with improved availability of domestically produced cigarettes following the rehabilitation and maintenance of the national tobacco-processing plant, as well as the stronger exchange rate. Establishing this relationship would require clearer evidence linking changes in domestic supply to market prices.

4.1.2. Transport

Transport recorded M-o-M deflation of 3.3 per cent in July 2026, as its index for Syria declined from 1112 points in June to 1075 points in July. The fall coincided with government revisions to fuel prices and their denomination in SYP, the appreciation of the SYP in the parallel market and a narrowing of the gap with the official rate. It was also accompanied by lower prices for vehicles and some imported goods included in the group.

The average price of subsidised fuel for private cars fell by 12 per cent, from approximately SYP 14800 per litre to SYP 13000, while the average price of unsubsidised fuel declined by 1 per cent, from about SYP 16300 to SYP 16100.

Lower fuel prices were partly reflected in collective transport fares. The fare for a bus or shared minibus journey within a city declined by 3 per cent, from approximately SYP 3158 in June to SYP 3071 in July. Intercity bus fares fell by 1 per cent, from SYP 347 to SYP 342 per kilometre. By contrast, the fare for a three-kilometre taxi journey within a city increased by 4 per cent, from approximately SYP 28300 to SYP 29300.

The transport index declined in 12 of the 14 governorates. Dara'a recorded the largest decline, at 7.3 per cent, followed by Deir-Ezzor at 5.5 per cent, Homs at 3.8 per cent, Idleb at 3.3 per cent and Hama at 3.1 per cent. It fell by 2.8 per cent in Damascus, 2.7 per cent in As-Sweida, 2.5 per cent in Rural Damascus, 1.8 per cent in both Tartous and Al-Hasakeh, 1.5 per cent in Ar-Raqqa and 1.3 per cent in Aleppo. By contrast, the index increased by 1.5 per cent in Quneitra and 0.9 per cent in Lattakia.

The increase in the taxi fare within the city, despite the decrease in the public transport index, indicates that the effect of the fuel reduction was not transmitted equally between modes of transport. Private transport is more sensitive to lack of availability, black market and waiting costs, while some public transport fares may be subject to administrative or negotiated pricing that is slower to change.

4.1.3. Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels

Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels recorded M-o-M deflation of 2.6 per cent in July 2026, as the group's CPI for Syria declined from 1905 points in June to 1855 points in July.

The contraction was driven mainly by a 7.0 per cent decline in the electricity, gas and other fuels index. The average price of refilling a subsidised gas cylinder fell by 14 per cent and its black-market price by 7 per cent. Subsidised diesel declined by 7 per cent and black-market diesel by 1 per cent. The regulated electricity tariff remained unchanged, while electricity from other sources became 1 per cent cheaper. These developments coincided with reductions in petroleum-product and gas-cylinder prices announced in the 28 July pricing bulletin.

The actual and imputed rents index declined by 0.8 per cent, as average monthly rent fell by about 1 per cent, from SYP 2.61 million in June to SYP 2.58 million in July. The dwelling maintenance and repair index declined by 1.1 per cent, alongside 2 per cent falls in the average prices of both cement and paint. By contrast, water supply and other dwelling-related services rose by 2.9 per cent. The public water charge per cubic metre increased by 17 per cent, while the average price of drinking water purchased from private sources remained broadly stable at SYP 56.7 thousand per cubic metre, equivalent to five barrels.

At the governorate level, the group index decreased in 10 governorates and stabilised in Lattakia, while it rose by 3.2 per cent in Al-Hasakeh, 1.6 per cent in Aleppo and 0.5 per cent in Idleb. Quneitra recorded the largest decline, at 9.5 per cent, followed by Ar-Raqqa at 6.5 per cent, Homs at 4.1 per cent, Rural Damascus at 3.9 per cent and Damascus at 3.1 per cent, while the remaining declines ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 per cent.

This means that the decline in the group's index in July does not negate the fact that it remained the highest group in the index level, and that it still reflects the accumulation of previous shocks in rents, energy, and water. Therefore, a distinction must be made between a limited monthly decrease and the absolute cost of housing and energy remaining at a very high level compared to the base year.

4.1.4. Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages

The food and non-alcoholic beverages group recorded M-o-M deflation of 1.3 per cent in July 2026, as its index in Syria declined from about 690 points in June to 681 points in July. The decline came mainly from food, whose index fell by 1.5 per cent to 681 points, while the non-alcoholic beverages index rose by 1.1 per cent to 687 points.

The decline was concentrated in pulses, vegetables and fruit. The pulses and vegetables index fell by 19.6 per cent across Syria—the largest decline among food subgroups—and decreased in every governorate. At item level, the average price of fresh tomatoes fell by 36 per cent, from approximately SYP 6800 per kilogramme in June to SYP 4300 in July, while cucumber prices fell by 34 per cent, from about SYP 7100 to SYP 4700. Potato and dry-onion prices declined by 6 and 2 per cent, respectively. The fruit index fell by 6.8 per cent, accompanied by declines of 13 per cent for apples and 2 per cent for bananas. Bread and cereals were stable, while sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery fell by 0.3 per cent.

Increases in animal-product prices moderated the overall food-price decline. The meat index rose by 10.3 per cent in 13 governorates, with Homs alone recording a decrease, of 0.9 per cent. Chicken was the main driver: its average price increased by 29 per cent, from approximately SYP 30000 per kilogramme in June to SYP 38800 in July. Average lamb and beef prices each rose by 3 per cent. Milk, cheese and eggs increased by 5.0 per cent, including 5 per cent increases in both milk and eggs and a 3 per cent rise in white cheese. Fish and seafood rose by 1.6 per cent, oils and fats by 2.2 per cent, and food products not elsewhere classified by 6.4 per cent. Rising meat, dairy and egg prices reduced the social benefit of cheaper fruit and vegetables: poorer households may benefit temporarily from lower vegetable prices but remain unable to compensate for inadequate protein and other nutrient-rich foods if meat and dairy prices continue to rise.

Non-alcoholic beverages increased by 1.1 per cent. Coffee, tea and cocoa rose by 0.8 per cent, while mineral water, soft drinks and fruit juices increased by 4.1 per cent. Changes across governorates ranged from a 2.9 per cent decline in Ar-Raqqa to a 4.8 per cent increase in Tartous. The overall food and non-alcoholic beverages index declined in 11 of the 14 governorates, while increasing by 2.1 per cent in Hama, 1.6 per cent in Tartous and 1.0 per cent in Idleb. Homs recorded the largest decline, at 5.5 per cent, followed by Damascus at 3.9 per cent, Quneitra at 3 per cent, Lattakia at 2.3 per cent, Ar-Raqqa at 1.8 per cent and Aleppo at 1.6 per cent. Overall, the monthly decline was driven chiefly by widespread reductions in fruit and vegetable prices, while upward pressures persisted in meat, dairy products, eggs and some beverages.

4.2. M-o-M Inflation by Governorate

Syria's overall CPI contracted by 1.9 per cent M-o-M in July 2026, falling to 991 points. The index declined in 11 of the 14 governorates, while it rose by 1.6 per cent in Al-Hasakeh, 0.7 per cent in Idleb and 0.3 per cent in Aleppo. Quneitra registered the largest decline, at 4.1 per cent, followed by Homs at 4 per cent, Ar-Raqqa at 3.3 per cent, Damascus at 3.2 per cent and Rural Damascus at 3 per cent. The index fell by 1.6 per cent in Dara'a, 1.2 per cent in As-Sweida and 1.1 per cent in Deir-Ezzor. Declines were more limited in Hama, Lattakia and Tartous, at 0.5, 0.4 and 0.2 per cent, respectively.

In terms of index levels, Homs recorded the highest value at 1470 points, followed by Aleppo at 1379 and Damascus at 1353. Ar-Raqqa recorded the lowest value at 885 points, followed by Idleb at 886 and Deir-Ezzor at 900.

Figure (2): Monthly inflation (M-o-M) of consumer prices by governorate in Syria during July 2026 (in percentages)



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

5. Price Dispersion across Governorates

The analysis uses the unweighted arithmetic mean of the coefficients of variation for the prices of goods and services within each main group. It therefore measures the degree of price dispersion across governorates rather than the price level itself. The results for July 2026 reveal wide geographical disparities: the unweighted mean coefficients of variation ranged from 0.319 for communications to 0.752 for transport. These differences reflect varying degrees of integration among local markets. Dispersion tends to be greater for goods and services affected by local supply and demand, transport costs and infrastructure availability, while prices tend to converge for services subject to uniform centralised pricing.

Transport recorded the highest mean coefficient of variation, at 0.752, driven by disparities in fuel prices and transport fares. Intercity fares ranged from SYP 255 per kilometre in Aleppo countryside to SYP 523 in Al-Hasakeh, while the cost of a three-kilometre taxi journey ranged from SYP 15 thousand in Deir-Ezzor to SYP 33 thousand in Damascus. These differences reflect variations in fuel prices and availability, operating costs, road conditions, demand density and fare-setting mechanisms across governorates.

Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels ranked second, with a mean coefficient of variation of 0.654. Average monthly rent ranged from SYP 600 thousand in Quneitra to SYP 8.36 million in Damascus and SYP 3.46 million in Homs. The cost of purchased water ranged from SYP 17.5 thousand per cubic metre in Ar-Raqqa to SYP 56 thousand in Rural Damascus. Although the public water tariff remained at SYP 39 per cubic metre in most governorates, it reached SYP 3656 in Aleppo countryside and SYP 4261 in Idleb. Electricity from alternative sources ranged from SYP 4974 per kilowatt-hour in Ar-Raqqa to SYP 9375 in Rural Damascus. Multiple pricing and subsidy regimes were also evident in fuel prices: the official price of petrol for private cars was approximately SYP 13.5 thousand per litre, compared with SYP 7448 in Al-Hasakeh, reflecting differences between areas under the transitional government and those under the AA.

Recreation and culture and household furnishings recorded similar mean coefficients of variation, at 0.571 and 0.568, respectively. In the former group, television prices ranged from approximately SYP 1.12 million in Ar-Raqqa to SYP 1.72 million in Damascus. Within household furnishings, the price of a locally manufactured bedroom suite ranged from SYP 4.03 million in Ar-Raqqa to SYP 19 million in Hama, while refrigerator prices ranged from SYP 2.51 million in Deir-Ezzor to SYP 7.43 million in Damascus. The mean coefficient for health was 0.535: a general-practitioner consultation ranged from SYP 25 thousand in Deir-Ezzor to SYP 90 thousand in Aleppo city. These differences reflect disparities in the availability of medical personnel, health-facility equipment and local purchasing power.

Tobacco and clothing and footwear recorded the same mean coefficient of variation, at 0.586. The price of a packet of domestically produced cigarettes ranged from approximately SYP 7.1 thousand in Idleb to SYP 12.8 thousand in Al-Hasakeh, while imported men's trousers ranged from SYP 126.9 thousand in Ar-Raqqa to SYP 507.9 thousand in Damascus. Food and non-alcoholic beverages recorded a mean coefficient of 0.486, with wide disparities in meat, fish and fruit prices. A kilogramme of lamb ranged from SYP 161.6 thousand in Al-Hasakeh to SYP 336.7 thousand in Damascus. Standard bread prices were more convergent because of administered pricing, ranging from SYP 3967 per kilogramme in Al-Hasakeh to SYP 4500 in

As-Sweida. These differences were associated with variations in quality and origin, supply routes, seasonality, transport and storage costs, and proximity to production areas.

Figure (3): Unweighted arithmetic averages of the coefficients of variation in the prices of goods and services according to the main consumption groups during July 20261



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

Education recorded a mean coefficient of variation of 0.466. Annual private-school fees for upper-secondary education ranged from SYP 3.25 million in Quneitra to SYP 15.93 million in Aleppo city, while the cost of a private tutoring session ranged from SYP 25.2 thousand in Deir-Ezzor to SYP 108.9 thousand in Idleb. Centrally determined university fees were more closely aligned. Miscellaneous goods and services recorded a mean of 0.383 despite wide disparities in some services: lawyers' fees ranged from SYP 50 thousand in Deir-Ezzor to SYP 1.09 million in Al-Hasakeh. Communications recorded the lowest mean coefficient, at 0.319, reflecting centralised pricing for calls and prepaid cards.

6. Contribution to M-o-M Inflation/Deflation

An analysis of the contribution of the main consumption groups to the 1.9 per cent M-o-M decline in the overall CPI in July 2026 shows that housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels was the principal driver, reducing the overall inflation rate by approximately 1.226 percentage points. Food and non-alcoholic beverages ranked second, with a negative contribution of 0.371 percentage points, followed by tobacco at 0.244 percentage points and transport at 0.215 percentage points. A very small decline in recreation and culture reduced the rate by approximately 0.0002 percentage points.

In the opposite direction, price increases in several groups moderated the overall decline. Miscellaneous goods and services added approximately 0.075 percentage points to inflation, while health contributed 0.031 percentage points, education 0.022, household furnishings 0.016, clothing and footwear 0.007 and communications 0.004 percentage points. Taken together, groups with falling prices reduced the CPI by approximately 2.055 percentage points, while groups with rising prices offset about 0.155 percentage points of that decline, leaving a net contraction of approximately 1.9 per cent.

Figure (4): Contribution of the main consumption groups to the monthly inflation/deflation rate in Syria during July 2026 (percentage points)



Note: The contribution in percentage points expresses how much each group added to or subtracted from the overall inflation rate; Therefore, the sum of the positive and negative contributions is approximately equal to the monthly inflation rate

Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

At the governorate level, housing, water and fuel dominated the contraction in most governorates. Its relative share of net deflation was 61.7 per cent in Damascus, 61.3 per cent in Rural Damascus, 60.7 per cent in Homs, 65.7 per cent in Ar-Raqqa, 62.5 per cent in Deir-Ezzor and 55.1 per cent in As-Sweida. In Lattakia, food and beverages were the principal driver of deflation, with a share of 138.4 per cent, while transport offset this movement with a negative share of 29.6 per cent. In Al-Hasakeh, where the overall CPI rose by 1.6 per cent, housing, water and fuel accounted for about 96 per cent of inflation, while lower food and transport prices moderated the increase, with negative shares of 11.5 and 6.9 per cent, respectively.

7. Exchange-Rate Developments

The average USD exchange rate in the parallel market fell from approximately SYP 14001 in June to SYP 13215 in July, a decline of 5.6 per cent. The average was approximately SYP 13198 in most governorates, compared with SYP 13371 in Al-Hasakeh. By contrast, the Central Bank of Syria maintained the USD rate in its official, remittance and foreign-exchange bulletins at SYP 12250 throughout July. The average official rate was therefore SYP 12250, 6.4 per cent higher than the June average of SYP 11510 following adjustments introduced late in the previous month. The unchanged official rate, combined with the decline in the parallel-market average, narrowed the gap between the two to approximately 7.9 per cent in July.

The TL also depreciated against the USD by an average of 1.2 per cent: the USD exchange rate rose from TL 46.56 in June to TL 47.1 in July and reached TL 47.4 at the end of the month.

Figure (5): Changes in the exchange rate of the SYP and the TL against the USD during July 20262



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

8. Wages in Syria

The July 2026 monthly consumer-price survey revealed wide disparities in nominal wages across sectors, occupational categories and areas. The average monthly wage of a university-educated public-sector employee was approximately SYP 1.506 million across Syria, compared with SYP 1.291 million for an employee with a basic-education qualification. These averages, however, conceal substantial geographical differences linked to the coexistence of different wage-setting systems in SYP-Governed Areas (SYP-GA), TL-Governed Areas (TL-GA) and AA areas.

The average monthly wage of a university-educated public-sector employee was approximately SYP 1.403 million in SYP-GA following the general 50 per cent increase introduced under Decree No. 67 of 2026. It stood at approximately SYP 2.295 million in areas formerly administered by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), compared with SYP 1.060 million in AA areas in Al-Hasakeh. The wage in TL-GA was therefore about 63.6 per cent higher than in SYP-GA and more than twice its level in Al-Hasakeh. By contrast, the observed average monthly wage of a public-sector university professor was approximately SYP 10.986 million across Syria, equivalent to 7.3 times the wage of a university-educated employee in the same sector. It reached approximately SYP 11.593 million in SYP-GA but only SYP 3.090 million in Al-Hasakeh, or about 26.7 per cent of the SYP-GA level.

These findings reflect two parallel tracks in public-sector wage policy during 2026: a general increase covering a broad segment of employees, and occupation-specific increases and allowances benefiting selected professional and administrative categories. Although the general increase raised nominal wages, the pay of university-educated employees and employees with basic-education qualifications remained relatively close, while some specialised occupations received increases amounting to several multiples of ordinary salaries. The result was a highly unequal public-sector pay structure, shaped by occupation, employing institution, allowance system, geographical area and the applicable institutional framework.

Table (3): Average monthly wages in Syria during July 2026 (in SYP)1

	SYP-Governed Areas (SYP-GA)	TL-Governed Areas (TL-GA)	AA areas (Al-Hasakeh)	Syria
A. Public-sector employees				
University professor	11,593,000	11,592,974	3,090,000	**10,985,637**
University-educated employee	1,402,500	2,294,921	1,060,000	**1,505,524**
Employee with basic-education qualification	1,288,500	1,428,122	1,040,000	**1,290,696**
B. Private-sector employees				
Company manager	10,945,306	8,051,030	10,558,080	**10,689,066**
Retail-shop worker	2,883,244	2,385,612	2,395,410	**2,812,611**
C. Civil society sector employees				
University-educated employee	5,907,957	4,730,691	6,370,170	**5,781,196**

Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

In the private sector, the average monthly wage of a company manager was approximately SYP 10.689 million across Syria, compared with SYP 2.813 million for a retail-shop worker; the manager therefore earned about 3.8 times as much. The corresponding managerial wage was approximately SYP 10.945 million in SYP-GA, SYP 8.051 million in TL-GA and SYP

10.558 million in Al-Hasakeh. The wage of a retail-shop worker was approximately SYP 2.883 million, SYP 2.386 million and SYP 2.395 million in the three areas, respectively.

These levels reveal a marked pay gap between senior management and retail workers in the private sector. A company manager earned about 3.8 times the wage of a retail-shop worker in SYP-GA, 3.4 times in TL-GA and 4.4 times in Al-Hasakeh. The differences may reflect qualifications, responsibilities, establishment size, type of economic activity and labour demand. Private-sector wages are determined in a contractual and market setting that differs from the public sector and are not directly governed by the wage and allowance decrees applying to public employees.

In the civil society sector, which includes civil society organisations and non-governmental and development bodies, the average monthly wage of a university-educated employee was approximately SYP 5.781 million across Syria. The highest average was recorded in Al-Hasakeh, at SYP 6.370 million, followed by SYP-GA at SYP 5.908 million and TL-GA at SYP 4.731 million. The relative proximity of wages in Al-Hasakeh and SYP-GA indicates that the geographical disparity was less pronounced than in the public sector, while the average remained comparatively lower in TL-GA.

Across Syria, the wage of a university-educated employee in the civil society sector was approximately 3.8 times that of an equivalent public-sector employee, slightly more than twice the wage of a retail-shop worker, and 54.1 per cent of the wage of a private-company manager. It therefore occupied an intermediate position in the wage structure: well above the pay of an ordinary government employee or retail worker, but below that of a private-company manager or public-sector university professor. This comparison should nevertheless be treated cautiously because civil society organisations differ in their institutional character, funding sources, size, operational scope, and the experience and responsibilities of their employees.

Failure to adjust the tax-exempt threshold and wage-income tax brackets in line with inflation and poverty lines converts part of any nominal wage increase into an additional tax burden, weakening its effect on purchasing power. Under the most recently published brackets, in circulation since July 2025, monthly income above SYP 1.1 million is subject to a marginal rate of 15 per cent, while the exempt threshold is only SYP 837 thousand. These thresholds bear little relation to current living costs: the estimated tax deduction from a monthly salary of SYP 5 million is approximately SYP 566 thousand, before social-insurance contributions. This imposes a disproportionate burden on low- and middle-wage earners. The Ministry of Finance announced that it was preparing a new tax system with broader exemptions, but the published announcement concerned a proposal under preparation and consultation rather than a final instrument in force. Comparing nominal wages with poverty lines before tax and other deductions is therefore insufficient, as disposable net pay may be considerably lower—particularly for employees who have moved nominally into higher tax brackets without any corresponding improvement in their ability to meet living costs.

In sum, Syria's wage structure in July 2026 displayed three overlapping forms of inequality: geographical disparities arising from different wage-setting and institutional systems; gaps among the public, private and civil society sectors; and differences within each sector between ordinary occupations and specialised or managerial positions. Inequality within the public sector was particularly striking: the average wage of a university professor slightly exceeded that of a private-company manager, while a university-educated public-sector employee earned only about one quarter of the wage of an equivalent employee in the civil society sector.

9. Poverty Lines in Syria

The monthly household abject poverty line—an indicator of food deprivation—was approximately SYP 3.38 million across Syria in July 2026. The lower poverty line stood at approximately SYP 5.32 million and the upper poverty line at SYP 7.35 million. Poverty lines were generally highest in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs and lower in As-Sweida, Lattakia, Deir-Ezzor and Tartous.

Figure (6): Monthly poverty lines in Syria during July 2026 (million SYP)[3]



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

The abject poverty line varied widely across governorates. It was highest in Damascus at approximately SYP 4.71 million per month, 39.1 per cent above the Syrian average, followed by Aleppo at SYP 4.24 million. Homs, Idleb and Dara'a followed at approximately SYP 3.79 million, SYP 3.76 million and SYP 3.67 million, respectively. It stood at approximately SYP 3.50 million in Al-Hasakeh and SYP 3.46 million in Hama, while Rural Damascus was close to the national average at SYP 3.36 million. Ar-Raqqa, Deir-Ezzor, Quneitra, Tartous and Lattakia recorded levels below the national average, with As-Sweida recording the lowest level at approximately SYP 2.13 million per month.

The gap between the highest abject poverty line, recorded in Damascus, and the lowest, recorded in As-Sweida, was approximately SYP 2.58 million. This disparity reflects differences in the cost of the basic food basket across governorates, but does not necessarily imply lower poverty rates where poverty lines are lower. The poverty line measures the cost of meeting minimum food needs; it does not measure household income or households' actual capacity to bear that cost.

Designing social-protection programmes or setting assistance values on the basis of a single national average may therefore produce substantial coverage shortfalls in higher-cost governorates, particularly Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, while appearing relatively adequate in lower-cost areas. Local poverty lines should consequently be used when estimating needs, rather than relying exclusively on a single national line.

Indicators of wage coverage of poverty lines in July 2026 reveal a wide gap between workers' incomes and the cost of meeting basic needs, with substantial variation across sectors and governorates. The indicator measures the proportion of a poverty line covered by a wage: coverage of 100 per cent means that the wage equals the poverty line, while a lower percentage indicates a shortfall. Across Syria, neither the wage of a university-educated public-sector employee nor that of a private-sector worker reached any of the three poverty lines. The wage of a civil society sector employee exceeded the abject and lower poverty lines but remained below the upper poverty line.

The university-educated public-sector employee faced the widest living-cost gap. The wage covered only 44.5 per cent of the abject poverty line, leaving a 55.5 per cent shortfall against the minimum cost of food needs. Coverage fell to 28.3 per cent of the lower poverty line and 20.5 per cent of the upper poverty line. A household relying on this wage alone would therefore require income equal to approximately 2.2 times the wage to reach the abject poverty line, 3.5 times to reach the lower line and 4.9 times to reach the upper line. Coverage of the abject poverty line ranged from 29.8 per cent in Damascus to 84.8 per cent in Idleb but remained below 100 per cent in every governorate.

Figure (7): Monthly wage coverage of poverty lines in Syria during July 2026 (in percentages)



Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research 2026, Monthly Survey of Consumer Prices in Syria.

The private-sector worker achieved higher, although still inadequate, coverage nationally. The wage covered 83.1 per cent of the abject poverty line, leaving a shortfall of 16.9 per cent; coverage fell to 52.9 per cent of the lower poverty line and 38.3 per cent of the upper poverty line. A household would therefore require income equal to approximately 1.2 times this wage to reach the abject poverty line, 1.9 times to reach the lower line and 2.6 times to reach the upper line. The wage exceeded the abject poverty line only in Rural Damascus and Lattakia, where coverage reached 112.9 and 110.4 per cent, respectively, and remained below the lower poverty line in every governorate.

The position of the civil society sector employee was comparatively better. The wage covered 170.9 per cent of the abject poverty line and 108.6 per cent of the lower poverty line, exceeding them by 70.9 and 8.6 per cent, respectively. Coverage of the upper poverty line was nevertheless only 78.7 per cent, leaving a shortfall of 21.3 per cent. National averages conceal important geographical disparities: the wage remained below the lower poverty line in Idleb, Aleppo, Dara'a and Quneitra, and exceeded the upper poverty line only in Ar-Raqqa, where coverage reached 123 per cent.

10. Conclusion

The July 2026 results show that a 1.9 per cent decline in the overall CPI is not, by itself, evidence of improved living conditions. Deflation was driven by lower prices for pulses, vegetables, some imported goods and the official prices of certain petroleum products, but occurred alongside continuing supply disruptions and a high actual cost of obtaining fuel, transport and services. July therefore exposed a fundamental gap between the “observed price” and the “cost of access”, particularly for fuel and related services.

This gap was particularly evident in the fuel market. Repeated official price adjustments, including reductions, neither ended petrol and diesel shortages nor eliminated reliance on the black market, and they did not prevent the crisis from spreading to transport, electricity, water and bread production. Al-Hasakeh was the clearest example: shortages of diesel allocated to public services partially disrupted generators, bakeries, mills, water stations and local transport. The problem therefore concerned not only the price level, but also the regularity of supply and the fairness of distribution.

July also demonstrated that a stronger exchange rate and lower prices for some imports do not necessarily constitute a productive recovery. Cheaper imported goods coincided with widening trade exposure to Türkiye and China, which may place further pressure on domestic agriculture and industry unless trade openness is accompanied by reliable energy, financing and production inputs, together with safeguards for fair competition. New banking channels with Türkiye may facilitate payments, but should be assessed according to whether they support production and balanced trade rather than imports alone.

Wage and poverty-line indicators confirm that the monthly contraction did not resolve the income crisis. The wage of a university-educated public-sector employee remained below half the abject poverty line, while that of a private-sector worker remained below the lower poverty line. The civil society sector wage did not reach the upper poverty line at the national level. A limited monthly fall in prices will therefore not translate into social improvement unless it improves effective access to food, energy, transport, housing and essential services.

In light of this, the following priorities emerge:

1. Reducing fuel prices, reducing their frequent adjustment, and ensuring regular supplies and efficient distribution, in a way that supports agriculture, industry, and public transport and reduces the burden on the consumer.
2. Raising the minimum wage and reviewing it according to inflation and poverty lines, addressing salary compression, and amending tax brackets on work income to become more fair and progressive.
3. Assessing the transmission of changes in the prices of fuel, electricity, bread, and transport to production and distribution costs, and adjusting transport tariffs and supporting its collective means.

4. Supporting agricultural production, reducing transport, storage, and marketing costs, and protecting producers from losses during abundant seasons, to achieve longer stability in food prices.
5. Develop flexible social protection that responds to price shocks, takes into account the varying cost of living, and reaches families dependent on one wage and the poorest groups in the governorates.
6. Gradually unifying markets and pricing systems for services and support within a fair framework that takes into account disparities in incomes and availability of services, and not considering seasonal declines as a sustainable improvement.
7. Supporting the local producer with energy, financing, and production inputs at stable prices, and implementing policies that limit unfair competition for imports without raising prices for consumers.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Consumer Price Index in Syria in July 2026, by consumption group and governorate (2021 = 100)

	Damascus	Rural Damascus	Homs	Hama	Tartous	Lattakia	Idleb	Aleppo	Ar-Raqqa	Deir-Ezzor	Al-Hasakeh	As-Sweida	Dara'a	Quneitra	Syria
All commodities	**1,353**	**1,097**	**1,470**	**1,145**	**1,141**	**1,148**	**886**	**1,379**	**885**	**900**	**1,235**	**1,055**	**1,080**	**1,116**	**991**
Food and Beverages	752	717	761	759	694	697	775	749	701	822	824	698	688	734	681
Tobacco	627	650	660	666	594	564	647	623	519	726	710	602	654	526	620
Clothes and Shoes	644	701	564	804	622	748	884	845	492	644	1,158	827	571	609	686
Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and fuel	2,302	2,175	3,311	2,406	2,197	2,464	1,340	2,316	1,767	1,435	2,189	2,279	2,658	2,091	1,855
Household equipment's and maintenance	771	474	624	1,010	482	513	758	569	458	437	1,055	524	839	611	593
Health	869	944	860	862	816	803	678	1,040	725	829	919	980	1,179	793	852
Transportation	1,666	1,334	1,483	1,377	1,395	1,911	608	976	1,079	1,008	1,486	1,078	957	1,617	1,075
Communications	331	330	331	331	328	329	48	333	330	333	338	333	332	330	202
Entertainment and Culture	445	697	481	407	421	471	492	764	611	593	614	528	475	323	506
Education	828	1,060	1,155	1,056	1,511	1,056	1,338	1,351	1,352	834	1,232	1,001	1,041	1,073	1,009
Various goods and services	930	1,003	1,114	866	965	715	925	970	933	929	1,089	979	937	1,848	976

Source: Syrian Center for Policy Research (2026), Monthly Consumer Price Survey in Syria.

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