DETERMINANTS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

MARCH 2021

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Introduction

The 2011 Syrian uprising for freedom, dignity and social justice was driven by a struggle to overcome the discrepancy between the aspirations of the society and reality provided by existing institutions. The conflict revealed the stifled institutional, economic and social status of society in Syria.

The conflict can be characterized by fanaticism, local and external despotism and subjugation which have played a decisive role in militarizing the conflict and taking advantage of the violence to worsen identity politics and cementing economies of war *(SCPR, 2016)*.

A decade of the conflict in Syria have resulted in the biggest human catastrophe since the Second World War. Hundreds of thousands have lost their lives and more than 5.6 million have fled to seek safety in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other hosting countries. By August 2019, the total number of displaced people inside Syria reached 6.14 million the world's largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to a conflict or violence *(UNHCR, 2020)*[1]. Between January to August 2019, the number of recent IDPs has reached 1.16 million of which the majority came from Idlib, by Hama and Deir Ez-Zor. Most IDPs have been displaced multiple times.[2] Despite a reduction in the intensity of fighting in 2019, the number of refugees and IDPs has not decreased, the rate of return was very low, and new displacement cases were recorded due to the renewed clashes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated around one hundred and thirty thousand new IDPs in the region of Afrin as a result of the "Ghosn Al-Zaitoon" (Olive Branch) Turkish military campaign until the end of May 2018.[3] The battle of Khan Shaykhun in Idlib which was launched by the Syrian government in August 2019

resulted in hundreds of thousands of new IDPs and over two hundred thousand have displaced in October 2019 due to the Turkish offensive "Naba Al-Salam" (Peace Spring) in north-eastern Syria (UNHCR, 2020).[4]

When it comes to forced displacement, the most frequently discussed push and pull factors in the literature are: violence *(Weiner, 1996; Moore and Shellman, 2006, 2007; Steele, 2009)* economic circumstances *(Schmeidl, 1997; Neumayer, 2005; Van Hear, 2006)* and intellectual networks *(Schmeidl, 1997; Davenport et al., 2003; Wood, 2008; Edwards, 2009)*. Armed conflicts, political violence or persecution are the main causes of forced immigration for most *(Zolberg et al., 1992; Schmeidl, 1997; Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Melander and Öberg, 2007)*. A close look at social capital, as well as the economic and social circumstances, could explain why people choose to leave or to stay in a conflict area. A study conducted by The German Institute for Local and International Studies *(Deacon and Görgens, 2019)* on determinants of forced displacement in Colombia, identified that major factors included violence and armed conflict, in addition to food security and climate change.

The study pointed out, however, that it is not possible to limit determinants to only these factors owing to complicated interconnections. For example, the effects of extractive activities on violence, social inequality and

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[1] https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html

[2] https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people

[3] https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-situation-update-afrin-district-and

[4] https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unhcr-syria-situation-report-north-east-syria-humanitarian-emergency-28

the living standards of local communities. Another study conducted on 157 countries over the period 2006-2015 identified the effect of climatic conditions due to waves of severe drought as encouraging armed conflict *(Guy J. et al., 2019)*.

The forced displacement of people is not just a side effect of a conflict, it is one of its goals, and a method to strategically reinforce political dominance. For example, forced displacement caused by ethnic cleansing could permanently change the sectarian geography of Iraq, with clear consequences over the political reconciliation and the country's stability *(Ferris, 2008)*. Forced displacement caused by conflict could become the main factor of fueling and perpetuating violence due to deprivation, discrimination, and exclusion that displaced people exposed.

Another study has focused on the socio-economic motivations behind forced displacement after the fall of Baghdad. It considered violence and armed conflict the main reasons for forced displacement, while economic and social factors did not play an important role in this context. Interestingly, the study reached an important conclusion that contradicts mainstream thinking that the majority of those who want to emigrate are among the most educated and have children *(Ozaltin et al., 2019)*.

The effects of social capital and socio-economic factors on decisions to migrate can be determined by focusing on what attracts or pushes people during violent conflicts. Social capital consists of institutional or unofficial networks that bond individuals, built primarily on a common sense of identity *(Stefanovic et al., 2014)*. This makes social capital an important push/attracting factor according to the location of these networks but few studies have discussed the relationship, mostly due to the lack of data and the difficulty of collecting the required data within conflict-prone *(Calhoun, 2010, Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011; Randell, 2016)*. Most focus on issues such as refugees and hosting community integration *(Loizos, 2000; Morrice, 2007)*, asylum seekers, and return *(Stefanovic and Loizides, 2011; Stefanovic et al., 2014; Smith, 2013)*.

Economic status, which is based on practical and professional experiences as well as education and income levels, is another fundamental socio-economic factor *(Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013)*. The real or potential negative changes in economic and social conditions as a result of conflict are clear push factors, whilst better conditions help determine destinations. Many studies have found a substantial relationship between forced migration and levels of economic development and

poverty in both original and targeted countries *(Adhikari, 2012; Moore and Shellman, 2007)*. The main factors of conflict-driven migration may be a mixture of economic and political factors *(Zetter et al., 2013, 2007)*, but studies do not find a significant link between GDP per capita and forced displacement *(Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2007; Khawaja et al., 2010)*.

In light of contradictory results, this report seeks to analyze the correlation between institutions, social capital, economic and social variables with rates of forced displacement and migration. A better understanding of forced displacement dilemma in Syria could help in producing sustainable strategies to address the forced displacement issue *(Zetter and Long, 2012)*. In a wider context, the inability to identify and react to the reality of social factors in driving migration is one of the main reasons behind the failure of immigration policy *(Castles, 2004)*. The widespread use of surveys could lead to policy-related results and could help in addressing forced displacement cases all over the world.

Many studies have sought to analyze cases of asylum and displacement and the associated economic and social circumstances with the aim of mapping needs and improving the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. This research, much of which is based upon vast field research, seeks to build on previous work and study the causes and factors driving displacement from one area to the other during the conflict.

The majority of existing research that analyses socioeconomic drivers of forced displacement focuses on existing refugees *(Betts, 2016; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016)* hereby ignoring those populations at risk of moving and becoming refugees or IDPs. It also noted the focus remains on the consequences of forced displacement *(Collier, 2013)* and not on its reasons and the process of deciding to leave *(Ozaltin et al., 2019)*. Moreover, the lack of data and theoretical tools has contributed to the decrease in new studies about this phenomenon.

It will always be difficult to come up with one theory that could explain the complicated phenomenon of forced displacement and migration *(Vezzoli et al., 2017)*, nevertheless, push factors including poverty, political instability, and religious fanaticism, and pull factors such as a democratic rule, economic prosperity, and work opportunities are both common referential points in forced migration literature *(Etling et al., 2018)*.

Understanding the determinants of displacement is important because it will assist in forecasting and predicting future displacement. Data has been used to develop standard regression models that are used to evaluate the relationship between the forced displacement and: institutional performance, direct violence, social relationships, the extent of economic violence and public service availability.

The importance of this research comes from the necessity to understand displacement size and its distribution, as well as, the driving factors. Some of these factors that are linked to the brutality of the military campaigns, the severity of violations, or the economic degradation and broken social relationships. To understand the phenomenon of push and pull factors for displaced persons in and from Syria, a study of the interactions between social, environmental and political components is needed.

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Population Living under Conflict

The Syrian conflict has fundamentally affected the structure and characteristics of the population of Syria; with demographic indicators showing radical changes. Firstly, the rate of population growth has declined from high pre-conflict rates to negative rates. This occurred as the population decreased by 2.3, 2.9, and 1.9 per cent during 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively to 19.22 million in 2017. However, 2018 and 2019 have seen positive growth, with a population increase of 0.9 per cent in 2018 and 1.1 per cent in 2019; the total population was 19.6 million in 2019. The decline in population is due to three factors. First: the intense death rate as an obvious result of the war. Second: the decline of birth rate which declined from 38.8 to 25.0 per thousand of the population between 2010 and 2017. This contrasts with studies that suggest an increment of fertility and birth rates during the war, especially among forcibly displaced people *(Urdal and Che, 2013; Islam et al., 2016; Shemyakina, 2011)*. The third is human flight and emigration. The number of refugees in neighbouring countries passed 5 million *(UNHCR, 2017)*, with the rates of net migration increasing

from 4 per thousand in 2010 to 70.5 per thousand in 2013. Net migration fell gradually to 34.3 for every thousand in 2017 and down to only 8 per 1,000 in 2019 *(SCPR, 2020)*.

As a demographic characteristic, the gender ratio has been fundamentally affected by the conflict, male to female ratio. The share of women increased due to several factors including the high rate of male death compared to females, and the disproportionate effect of forced displacement on males who are at increased risk of arrest, kidnapping or being forced to join military service. The female percentage of the total non-displaced population was 51 per cent, while the female-male ratio among the internally displaced was 57 per cent. The age structure of the population has also changed as the proportion of people aged 15 to 39 years has declined. This is especially noticeable among IDPs, either due to the forced displacement related to the war circumstances and avoiding military service or due to the involvement in the military campaigns which generate more war victims. These structural shifts were accompanied by a relative increase in the other age categories, especially children under the age of 15. According to the conflict scenario, the population pyramid in Syria shows a huge change in the population and its structure by the year 2018, in comparison with the counterfactual scenario (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Population Pyramid of Syria 2019: Current Scenario vs. Counterfactual Scenario

**Source: Population Status Survey (2014), SPRC assessments of (2019)**

Note: Green refers to females' number inside Syria during the conflict in 2018, grey refers to males' number inside Syria during the conflict in 2018 Current Scenario, blue refers to females' number inside Syria if the crisis did not happen, orange refers to males' number inside Syria if the crisis did not happen (Counterfactual Scenario)

The population pyramid inside Syria during the conflict *(conflict scenario)* was estimated based on the population estimations according to the population survey of 2014 (SCPR, 2016), fertility projections *(SCPR, 2020)*, the death rate (SOHR, 2018) and refugees' number (UNHCR, 2018). According to these estimations, the population of Syria has reached 19.38 million in 2018.

The 2018 population projections which are made on the assumption of no conflict (counterfactual scenario), were

based on the Syrian populations in 2010. The projections assume a slow decline in fertility rate by using the fertility model of 2010 which was prepared based on the population's civil records. It also assumed that migration would continue on a similar trajectory to recorded levels between 1994 and 2010. Utilizing Syria's 2010 life tables, it is estimated that if the conflict would never have happened, the population would stand at 27.12 million in 2018 as opposed to 19.38 million.

Figure 2: Annual numbers of IDPs in Syria: 2011 - 2019 (thousand)

| 161 | 1615 | 4839 | 5653 | 6361 | 6240 | 6154 | 6184 | 6205 |

| 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2019 | 2019 | 2017 | 2019 | 2019 |

Source: Population Status Survey (2014), and the estimations of UNHCR (2019)

The forced displacement of more than half of the Syrian population, whether internal or external, reflects the conflict's devastating impacts. Those who have been forcibly displaced have lost their material and non-material possessions leaving behind their belongings, income sources, and social relationships and had to flee, exposing them to neglect and exclusion. The rapid increase in forced displaced people between 2011 and 2013 rose to almost 5 million and then stabilized at around 6 million by the end of 2018. Forced displaced people from around one-third of the Syrian population who still reside in Syria (Figure 3). The population distribution inside Syria has also changed drastically as individuals have sought safer towns and regions. The below Figure 4 shows the degradation of the population share of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Al-Hasakah in return for an increase of the population of Idlib, Rif Dimashq (rural Damascus) and mainly Damascus city. According to the 2018 UNHCR report, the largest number of IDPs are in Rif Dimashq at 1,227 thousand followed by Idlib with 1,125 thousand then Aleppo with 990 thousand. The percentage of the forced displaced populations in Idlib, Rif Dimashq, Damascus, and Aleppo have reached 54 per cent, 38 per cent, 32 per cent, and 28 per cent respectively (Figure 5).

Figure 3: Relative Population Distribution, by Governorates: 2010, 2014 & 2018

Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (2010), Population status survey (2014), OCHA (2018) and the calculations of SCPR

Figure 4: Forced displaced persons as percentage of population by Governorate 2018

Source: HNO: OCHA 2019 https://hno-syria.org/#sector-needs

Seven main waves of forced displacements inside and outside of Syria have occurred since 2011 *(Dahi, 2019)*. The first wave, in the middle of 2011 was due to the initiation of several military campaigns and the increment of violence used by security forces as well as arbitrary arrest, kidnapping and enforced disappearance. This wave was towards Lebanon and Turkey where the first refugees camp was opened in Antalya – Turkey. Social relationships have played an important role in choosing the destination, as people living in the border areas had escaped to the neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, especially those who have friendships, relatives, or work relationships in these countries. The remaining forced displaced have internally migrated. The second wave of immigration begun in the spring of 2012 when the struggle turned into a conflict, resulting in services degradation and infrastructure destruction including housing units, schools, and hospitals. It was there when the number of officially recorded refugees reached 500 thousand with around 1.6 million displaced. The third wave of immigration began in 2013 as the map of geopolitical dominance started to appear. This wave was driven by the continuous systematic destruction of infrastructure and service establishments as well as heavy bombardment which claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians. It was also driven by the occupation of several towns and areas by fundamentalist groups and increasing security violations and collective punishments that were being used by security forces and affiliates. Young men fleeing the country to avoid military service has been one of the main contributors of emigration. At the end of 2013, the number of IDPs reached 4.8 million, in addition to 1.9 million refugees *(SCPR, 2020)*.

The fourth wave of displacement occurred in 2014 when The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) emerged. Many civilians fled the shelling operations that were launched by the conflict parties which led to massive destruction of urban infrastructure. The number of forced displaced persons jumped to 5.7 million at the end of 2014 and the number of refugees to about 3 million. The fifth wave of displacement and forced immigration was towards Europe in 2015. The Federal office for migration and refugee's database for 2015 indicated that about 1.1 million asylum seekers had arrived in Germany, whereas the figure for 2015 was retroactively estimated to have been around 890,000 newly arrived asylum seekers. The arrival of almost one million new asylum seekers within eight months, particularly in the months between July 2015 and February 2016 *(BAMF, 2018)*. By the end of 2015, the number of refugees had reached about 3.5 million. Fierce battles continued throughout 2015 along with the expansion of the opposition's as well as ISIS's areas of control. With direct Russian military intervention in September 2015, which was followed by even more

violent battles, the number of internally displaced increased to 6.4 million by the end of 2015 *(SCPR, 2020)*. Since March 2016, a sixth phase has begun as countries imposed heavy restrictions on Syrians asylum seekers. Under these restrictions, immigration evolved into mostly illegal immigration. Those who arrived and acquired authorized residency permits were able to bring their families through what is called "reunion" and the number of refugees reached 4.3 million at the end of 2016. The total number of IDPs remained close to the previous year at 6.2 million. From 2017 till 2019, the seventh phase had begun. This was driven by the battle of Aleppo at the end of 2016, the expansion of areas under the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces control, and the retreat and eventual defeat of ISIS. The regime has also gained control over the eastern Ghouta, Daraa, Al Qunaitra, Ar Rastan, and parts of the rural Idlib and Hama. The phase was accompanied by forced displacement operations of the population towards Idlib and rural Aleppo. By the end of 2018, the number of recorded refugees had reached 5.5 million, and the number of IDPs 6.2 million. Despite the subsiding intensity of fighting in 2018 and 2019, the rates of return if displaced persons were insignificant, likely due to the absence of the political horizon and the continuity of the arbitrary security policies, in addition to the massive destruction *(SCPR, 2020)*.

The seventh phase has been driven by Turkish military campaigns and invasion of Afrin and Al-Jazeera as well as the policies of the neighbouring countries which have sought to strongly encourage the return, and eventually deport refugees, notably from Jordan and Lebanon. Figure 6 shows the characteristics of forced displacement during the conflict according to the population status survey. 30 per cent of IDPs were concentrated in Aleppo, 23 per cent in Rif Dimashq, 9 per cent in Damascus, and 62 per cent have settled in other areas within their cities. The largest number of fugitives have fled from Rif Dimashq, followed by Aleppo city, then Damascus city in 2014 (Figure 7). The last report of the World Bank in this regard *(World Bank, 2019)* revealed that Aleppo has lost most of its population for the past 7 years (around 1.3 million), followed by Raqqa city (500 thousand), then Homs (400 thousand) and Al-Hasakah (around 400 thousand). Migration between the cities is not the largest form of internal displacement.

Instead, most displacement cases occurred near to the original places of residency, inside the same city. Most of IDPs suffer from bad health, psychological and physical conditions; families were separated and scattered, many families have lost one or more of their members or provider due to the killing, kidnapping and migrating, income sources have shrunk or stolen, properties were lost and savings were drained to secure the minimum requirement of living.

Half of the forced displaced people live in rented houses which add even more financial burden on them, while 30 per cent of IDPs were hosted by their relatives and friends, and 13.5 per cent live in official and non-official accommodation centres *(SCPR, 2016)*.

Figure 5 (A) IDPs origin distribution map B) the number of forced displaced people from the governorates

Figure 6 A) IDPs Distribution map, by Origin (B), Number of people who migrated to the governorates

Source: Population status survey (2014) and SCPR calculations

Research Methodology

The research utilizes current and pre-conflict local level demographic data in Syria, describing and comparing demographic characteristics of selected areas. The research also employs a counterfactual scenario for the preconflict period which entails predicting what the hypothetical current rate or figure would be for an indicator if the conflict had never occurred. As such, this methodology takes into account actual reductions, but also tries to capture lost growth that did not occur because of the conflict.

The counterfactual scenario is used to measure the impact of the conflict on the demographic indicators including death, fertility, and migration rates. The methodology includes a study of population indicators based on an evaluation of the "population status survey" (2014) in Syria and the data of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the area level. An econometric model was used to measure the push factors for IDPs leaving the study area, while another model was used to study the pull factors for IDPs coming to the area studied. The model studies the relationship between forced displacement and economic violence, conflict-related deaths, health and education conditions, the social capital, and the performance of the effective establishments, within the area studied. The results offer an important entrance to understand forced displacement from a wider perspective. Based on a review of forced displacement literature and the characteristics of the Syrian conflict, this report has specified the main structural variables linked to forced displacement. Among the most important of these are the armed conflict, as well as, the direct and (stochastic) use of violence which the research assumes has been decisive in pushing people to leave their homes and seek asylum in safer places. The research also assumes that performance (or Governance) is important regarding staying or leaving, as institutional performance is a crucial root cause of conflict in Syria, serving to complicate and perpetuate the conflict. The research also assumes that social capital affects

forced displacement. The absence of trust, common values or cooperation between members of society drive migration. This is especially true considering the use of identity politics in the Syrian conflict, where ethnic, racial, religious, regional, familial and social class divisions are exploited to incite violence, violating the dignity and fuel the conflict.

The research does not ignore the impact of economic and service factors, especially economic violence, in increasing the rates of forced displacement. The conflict goes hand in hand with narrowing economic opportunities, property loss and infrastructure destruction for the majority in combination with a small influential group that benefited from looting, royalties, monopoly and direct involvement in the armed conflict. Finding new sources of livelihood in better, less dangerous circumstances has led to waves of migration (Figure 1).

The structural factors that push people to leave are interrelated and interconnected which make attempts to identify the relative power and weighting of each factor is difficult and less certain. it is therefore essential to use several quantitative and qualitative methods and research tools to explore the mechanisms of forced displacement. The structural factors are also translated into direct causes that push people to leave, such as lack of food, injury or death of a family member or a neighbourhood resident.

Figure 7 : The frame of displacement reasons and attraction factors under the armed conflict

Causes of displacement

- Armed violence — 01
- Bad governance — 02
- Social refraction — 03
- Economic violence — 04
- Social capital deterioration — 05
- Environmental deterioration — 06

Forced Displacement

Attracting factors

- 01 — Safety and stability
- 02 — Good governance
- 03 — Social solidarity
- 04 — Productive economy
- 05 — Human capital empowerment
- 06 — Sustainability

The Model

The research uses a cross-sectional regression model to study the determinants of forced displacement in Syria. The model relies on data from the 2014 survey of the population status, which covers both residents and displaced population throughout Syria.

The fieldwork was carried out through a questionnaire of key persons in their areas (three key persons per area). 698 areas distributed among governorates were studied. The survey was based on a wide analytical framework that included all different aspects related to the human condition, be it demographic, economic, services, social and institutional to provide the necessary data to have a deep understanding of the relationship between those variables and the development status on a local level. Annexe (1) includes the details of the methodology of the population status survey.

The model was built to explain forced displacement in terms of regions that have expelled the forced displaced people as well as regions that have received them. Many models were used according to the following related variables: The percentage of IDPs to the population in the studies area (receiving area), and the percentage of abroad departures to the population of the studied area (Leaving area), and finally the percentage of IDPs who left the studied area (Leaving area).

Five factors had been chosen as determinants of the forced displacement:

First, the Death Rate which represents the armed conflict and use of violence that includes those who died as a direct and indirect result of the conflict and does not include those who died due to natural causes.

Second, the Social Capital index, which represents social relationships and is an index that is built from several secondary variables including social networks, societal trust, and common values and visions (SCPR, 2017).

Third, Living Conditions Index which is a composite indicator that represents the living and economic aspects and includes several secondary indicators (housing conditions and its facilities, the availability of fuel, electricity and sanitation, communications, and transportation).

Fourth, Institutions Index which represents the institutional aspect and is a composite indicator that includes several secondary indicators (Rule of Law, accountability's level, violence, the effectiveness of public institutions, equality rate, and corruption).

Fifth, Education Index which represents human development is a composite indicator that includes several secondary indicators (Availability of services, human resources, and education enrolment rate). Finally, the model used the governorates to control the spatial factors that are not included among the other variables *(SCPR, 2020)*.

Model Scope: Destination of displaced persons

$$idp\_t = \alpha 1 + Mortality + SCI\_t + LCI\_t + +INSI\_t + MOHA + e \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots(1)$$

Model Scope: Internally displaced (Origin)

$$internal\_dep\_t = \alpha 2 + Mortality + SCI\_t + LCI\_t + INSI\_t + MOHA + \upsilon \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots(2)$$

Model Scope: Refugees (Origin)

$$external\_dep\_t = \alpha 3 + Mortality + SCI\_t + LCI\_t + INSI\_t + MOHA + \mu \quad \ldots\ldots(3)$$

Model Scope: Total of departure (Origin)

$$tot\_(dep\_t) = \alpha 4 + Mortality + SCI\_t + LCI\_t + +INSI\_t + MOHA + \omega \quad \ldots\ldots(4)$$

idp_t:
Proportion of displaced people relative to the population of the receiving area

internal_dep_t:
Proportion of IDPs/departures relative to the population of the area

external_dep_t:
Proportion of the refugees/departures relative to the population of the area

tot_dep_t:
Proportion all displaced people/departures (internal and external) to the population of the leaving area

Mortality:
Mortality due to direct or indirect effects of conflict (does not include death due to natural causes)

SCI_t:
Social capital index during the conflict

LCI_t:
Living condition index during the conflict

INSI_t:
Institution performance index (Governance) during the conflict

EI_t:
Education index during the conflict

MOHA:
Governorate

1,2,3,4 α:
Constant

e, υ,μ,ѡ:
Random Error

Displacement Determinants Model Results
Table 1: Determinants Forced Displacement in Syria

	MODEL 1 Destination of displaced persons	MODEL 2 Internally displaced (Origin)	MODEL 3 Refugees (Origin)	MODEL 4 Total of departure (Origin)
	coef/se	coef/se	coef/se	coef/se
Mortality	-0.501***	0.615***	0.018	0.632***
	-0.191	-0.109	-0.104	-0.142
Social capital	-0.280***	0.035	-0.050*	-0.015
	-0.055	-0.032	-0.03	-0.041
Living condition index	0.131***	-0.113***	-0.082***	-0.195***
	-0.048	-0.028	-0.026	-0.036
Institution index	0.193***	-0.044	-0.080***	-0.124***
	-0.054	-0.031	-0.029	-0.04
Education index	0.092***	-0.137***	-0.019	-0.157***
	-0.035	-0.02	-0.019	-0.026
Aleppo	0.025	-0.013	-0.047***	-0.060**
	-0.033	-0.019	-0.018	-0.025
Rif Dimashq	0.114***	0.03	-0.042**	-0.012
	-0.032	-0.018	-0.017	-0.024
Homs	-0.106***	-0.039*	-0.074***	-0.113***
	-0.038	-0.022	-0.021	-0.028
Hama	-0.054	-0.054***	-0.036*	-0.091***
	-0.035	-0.02	-0.019	-0.026
Lattakia	-0.104***	-0.091***	-0.046**	-0.137***
	-0.038	-0.022	-0.021	-0.028
Idlib	0.095**	0.017	-0.015	0.002
	-0.041	-0.023	-0.022	-0.03
Al-Hasakah	-0.096**	-0.184***	0.003	-0.181***
	-0.045	-0.026	-0.025	-0.034
Deir ez-Zur	-0.088***	-0.054**	-0.128***	-0.182***
	-0.042	-0.024	-0.023	-0.031
Tartus	-0.140***	-0.089***	-0.046**	-0.136***
	-0.041	-0.024	-0.022	-0.031
Raqqa	-0.094*	-0.124***	-0.022	-0.146***
	-0.052	-0.03	-0.028	-0.039
Daraa	0.140***	0.004	0.150***	0.154***
	-0.046	-0.026	-0.025	-0.034
As Suwayda	-0.143***	-0.088***	-0.083***	-0.171***
	-0.055	-0.032	-0.03	-0.041
Al Qunaitra	0.243**	-0.01	-0.074	-0.084
	-0.113	-0.064	-0.061	-0.084
The Constant	0.175***	0.323***	0.254***	0.578***
	-0.044	-0.025	-0.024	-0.033
Number of views	668	668	668	669
Adjusted R^2	0.51	0.299	0.445	0.251
Log-Likelihood	373.12	582.21	547.14	172.18
Note	0.01>p ***	0.05>p **	0.1>p *	

The most statistically significant factor identified in the model was the mortality rate *(coef. -0.501)*. **The results point out that displacement rates towards the area studied are inversely associated with mortality attributed directly or indirectly to the conflict.**

Pull and Push Factors

As identified in Table 1, the results of Model 1 identified all five indices, 'violence', 'Social', 'Living', 'Institutional' and 'Educational' were found to be significant. The most statistically significant factor identified in the model was the mortality rate *(coef. -0.501)*. The results point out that displacement rates towards the area studied are inversely associated with mortality attributed directly or indirectly to the conflict. Displaced persons appear to seek to settle in areas which are less seriously affected by conflict. The second strong association was the 'Social Relationships' indicator *(Coef. -0.280)*, where displacement rates are negatively associated with social capital. It is unlikely that displaced persons are deliberately moving to areas with poor relations and social ties. Instead, the strong association is likely to retrospectively reflect the stresses that the arrival of migrants has placed on the host society. This tension between the displaced people community and the hosting community for political, social, and economic considerations is well documented.

Displacement rates were found to be positively associated with institutional performance and Governance levels *(Coef. 0.193)*, indicating that displaced people tended to move to areas that have a relatively low rate of violence, discrimination, corruption, and absence of law authority. 'Living Conditions' were found to be the next most significant factor *(Coef. 0.131)*. The relationship between immigration and living conditions is positive, indicating that displaced persons seek places that have better residences and services such as communications, transportation, electricity, water and work opportunities. Finally, comes the 'Human Development' reflected in the education indicator *(Coef. 0.092)*, indicating that displacement rates are positively associated with higher levels of human development like good education infrastructure with high-quality teaching staff and high rates of enrolment. In addition to the previous indicators, the results refer to other factors by governorate that affects the IDPs movements. Relative to Damascus city, there were higher intangibleness factors to attract displaced people to Rif Dimashq, Daraa, and Al Qunaitra,

despite that these cities have witnessed a high rate of displacement because many have preferred to migrate within their governorates due to proximity and social relationships. While Tartus, As Suwayda, Lattakia and Homs had fewer attracting factors than Damascus.

When it comes to the push factors that drive displacement, the results of model 4 show the strong negative relationships between forced displacement and indices for living conditions, education, and institutional performance. The results also point to the extremely strong association that conflict-associated mortality has on driving displacement. The intensity of the armed conflict, deterioration of governance levels and the social and service conditions contribute to the forced displacement of people from their places of residence.

The factors that drive displaced persons to migrate either within Syria as IDPs, or leave Syria as refugees vary according to the results in Table 1 (Model 2 and Model 3). The results highlight that deterioration of 'Human Development' and 'Living Conditions' indices along with conflict-related mortality rates are the main factors driving the internally displaced inside Syria. The most important factors driving a displaced person to migrate outside of Syria include the deterioration of living conditions, bad institutional performance and the impairment of the social capital.

The above-shown results reveal the importance of social, economic and development factors in driving immigration and choosing the future place of residency. Within this frame, the research discusses the performance determinants of forced displacement, which have fallen with unprecedented rates due to the conflict.

Institutional Performance

Using military and security forces to suppress uprisings has generated unprecedented levels of armed violence across the Middle East and North Africa Region. In Syria, such violence has destroyed the foundations of society and state alike, while the involvement of international and regional forces has contributed to making the conflict politically, militarily, economically, and culturally worse and more difficult to resolve.

During the conflict, institutions have been reformed, the country was divided between military forces, mobile borders have been established between the regions, and institutions focus their work on violence and subjugation of people and control resources. Governance indications show a collapse in institutional performance, which was already weak before the conflict (Figure 8) *(SCPR, 2020)*.

Figure 8: Political Stability and the Absence of Violence: 2005 – 2018

Figure 9: The 'institutions' index and its secondary components in Syria: 2010, 2014 & 2018

Source: Population Status Survey (2014), SCPR Estimations (2018)

There is no room for societal participation or accountability in institutions in Syria under a conflict. Both old and new subjugating powers have adopted more aggressive tactics to reinforce dominance through fear and violence, and killing, besiegement, expelling, and torture have become institutional tools to impose dominance. That was accompanied by the cracking of the state and the transition of the role of official and unofficial institutions to wasting human life and dignity (Figure 9).

The degradation of institutional performance, the absence of both legal authority and judiciary independence, along with the severe violation of rights, discrimination, and systematic looting are among the main factors that forced people to evacuate their cities and towns. With the escalation in conflict and fragmentation of the country into various powers, four main modalities of ruling models have emerged in Syria. The central model in areas of which the regime has control over; the unregulated model where the opposition forces have control; the non-central model in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces and the extreme model in areas occupied by ISIS. These model have a few things in common; of military and security forces over authority, the use of terror, subjugation, and humiliation to control territories and forming alliances with international and regional forces to obtain sustainable control.

The ending of conflict, as well as the safe, decent, and voluntary return of displaced populations, are dependent upon the extent to which formal and informal institutions can undergo structural transformation and improve their performance. These institutions must gradually expand the space for participation, dialogue and accountability. They should facilitate the establishment of social alliances to fight tyranny and societal divisions and the solidifying ethical and legal foundations to solve quarrels away from using violence, and developing fair policies that would support those most affected by war.

Armed violence

After hundreds of battles and millions of casualties over a decade, the end of the Syrian conflict does not seem to be any nearer. Figure 10 shows that despite the reduction in the number of battles in 2018, shelling and detonation campaigns have returned in 2019.

## Figure 10: Number of incidents linked to violence in Syria: 2017 - 2020

This occurred notably with aggression by the regime forces on Idlib city, as well as the invasion of the Turkish forces into autonomous areas of the northeast to form a "safe zone". The conflict is far from being over, with areas of Idlib, Aljazeera region and parts of rural Aleppo and Lattakia expected to witness fighting in the coming months. This is in addition to the instability in many regions that are controlled by the regime.

One of the most important indicators used in describing the extent, as well as its intensity and ferocity of violence, is the number of killed, injured or disabled persons (see Figure 10). SCPR estimations show incremental increases in net mortality rates, from 4.4 per thousand in 2010 to 7 per thousand in 2019 *(SCPR, 2020)*. Until the end of 2019, conflict-associated mortality reached about 570 thousand death cases *(SCPR, 2020)*. Life tables that were developed using data from the population survey's results in 2014 reveal serious inequalities in the distribution

of mortality by age and gender. In 2019, the average difference in life expectancy between men and women reached 7 years; 59.4 years for men and 66.9 for women (Figure 11).

Deaths among males, notably adult men, represent 82.2 per cent of the total conflict-related deaths. This reflects the number of men who are involved in fighting as well as the targeting of civilian men through kidnap, arrest, torture and punitive killings by military forces.

Figure 11: Life Expectancy at Birth in Syria: 2010-2019


Source: JSCPR, (2020)

Social Factors

The involvement of internal and external forces has directly fueled the conflict, shrunk the space of civil and democratic forces and hindered their ability to mitigate the effects of the conflict on civilians.

Tyrannical forces have invested in identity politicization as a tool of attraction for various forces on ethnic, sectarian, regional and linguistic basis, which has led to the dismantling of social ties and destruction of the social capital in its three components (Social networks and relationships, societal trust, common visions, and values).

As a result, the social capital index has decreased from 0.745 in 2010 the conflict to 0.420 in 2019 *(SCPR, 2017)* (Figure 12).

The conflict has divided the geography and wealth of Syria, sharing it among the conflicting forces and their allies. The politicization of identity has played an important role in fueling war through evoking rejection of others and spreading the culture of hatred by a brutal murder and media incitement that contributed to discrimination on religious, ethnic and political bases, in addition to using educational institutions as platforms to spread and engrain distrust from an early age.

Figure 12: Social Capital Index and its Components: 2010, 2014, and 2019

Source: SCPR, (2017, 2020)

Economic factors

The conflict in Syria is a war in which local, regional and international parties have overlapped with each other and formed an enormous burden on the Syrian economy and its natural, financial and human resources.

The Syrian Center for Policy Research has estimated that the accumulated losses of GDP are 530.1 billion USD at the end of 2019, equal to 9.7 times of GDP of 2010 at constant prices *(SCPR, 2020)*. The report referred that social and economic losses have passed the capacity of the Syrian economy.

Internal trade and government service sectors have experienced the biggest share of losses. The total economic losses accounted for more than 7 times the GDP for 2010. The unemployment rate has reached 42.3 per cent in 2019 accompanied by a hyper increase in prices, where the consumer price index (CPI) increased 18 times between 2011-2019.

The mechanisms of a war economy have been institutionalized and worsened the rates of poverty and deprivation, producing networks of warlords who became rich at the expense of the Syrian people. Based on the average total poverty line of households (which is equal to an average of 181 thousand Syrian Liras per month), the rates of poverty have reached a critical level, with a total poverty rate of 93.7 per cent by the end of 2017 *(SCPR, 2020)* (See figure 13).

Although 2019 witnessed some improvement where poverty rate decreased to 86 per cent, the recent development in health and security sectors warns of a rise in poverty rates to more dangerous levels.

The foundations of war economy were solidified through widespread destruction, the availability of weapons,

86%

Based on the average total poverty line of households (which is equal to an average of 181 thousand Syrian Liras per month), the rates of poverty have reached a critical level, with a total poverty rate of 86 per cent by the end of 2019

looting of resources and terrorizing people to suppress them and force them to join the war. Resources were redistributed towards conflict-related activities, and public services, as well as public products, were redirected to serve the war economy.

The Syrian government along with other forces in areas outside the control of the Syrian regime have continued adopting policies that contributed to impoverishing people through the absence of support, injustice with aid distribution, and providing preferential privileges to the dominant economic elite who formed abroad conflict-related networks.

The results of the regression model revealed the strong relationship between the deterioration of living conditions and forced displacement of people who have chosen to or could migrate to places that have better economic and living conditions. The destruction of infrastructure as well as housing units, water, and power stations has formed an important factor in people's forced displacement.

Figure 13: extreme poverty incidence in Syria by governorate 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017-2019

Source: Families Health Survey (2009), Population Status Survey (2014), Calculation by SCPR (2020)

Human development

Syrians are still losing millions of years of education with the number of children (5 -17) who are outside school reached 2.3 million in 2019 (Figure 14). This represents a slight improvement on the 3.08 million figure of 2014 but is still catastrophic. Those children will suffer from the lack of skills and knowledge, in addition to the direct impact of the conflict (SCPR, 2020).

Emigration has always been linked to the deterioration of services related to social capital, such as health and education. Both education and health systems were affected by the destruction of infrastructure, reduction in spending and the losses of professional educational staff. Human development sectors were also affected by weapons of war and society subjugation tactics such as siege and service deprivation. The model showed the importance of these sectors in driving the displacement of individuals.

Figure 14: Number of children non-enrolled in elementary and secondary education: 2011 - 2019

● Children oos　　　● Secondary oos　　　● Basic oos

Source: Ministry of education, Central Bureau of Statistics, & SCPR estimations (2019)

Conclusion and Recommendations

The research offers a conceptual and applicable frame to identify and measure the determinants of the forced displacement. The research results reveal the significance of both institutional and social capital factors as well as living conditions in understanding the push and pull dynamics of displacement in the Syrian conflict. The research highlights that exclusionary and non-participatory institutions that use violence and terror as a tool for dominance and violate private and public rights are the main drivers of displacement. The destruction of social capital through the dismantling of social networks, the absence of national consensus, trust deterioration as well as common values, also contribute significantly to decisions regarding displacement, as do economic and living conditions aspects as well as the availability of education opportunities. This understanding requires new policies that can increase work opportunities, rebuild services and rehabilitate health and education establishments in both quantity and quality, including an improvement in human resources of both the education and health sectors.

Although the intensity of the conflict appears to be decreasing, the conflict is not over. With no agreement on a political solution, power monopoly, identity politicization, the denial of opportunities, continuity of the arbitrary detention and suppression of public freedom, these unsolved security aspects will continue to perpetuate the conflict. These issues need a radical solution that guarantees the lives of Syrians. Dismantling the economy of war could be a big barrier for disarmament programs, military release, and reintegration, which are an essential component of current peace operations, as well as any Conflict *(Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005)*. In addition to dismantling the economies of war, the root unfair social and economic policies instigated by the involved parties that led to the conflict, have in themselves worsened. The absence of trust in the official and non-official institutions has become a decisive factor in whether Syrians make the decision to return. This calls for a change in all policy priorities. Changes must be carried out towards maintaining the lives of all individuals, young and old. Securing a convenient environment for inhabitants to return, starting by working towards a more efficient and participatory governance structure. This will enable a public dialogue on how to overcome both the effects of war and its root causes. Such an institutional governance approach will also serve

to build a social, economic and political environment, where armed violence is not used to solve disagreements and problems. One of the most important matters that come hand in hand with institutional transformation is rebuilding trust among members of society and improving establishments that bond citizens to each other under human-centered values and principles. This could be done through the development of the social politics that allow bridge building, and transboundary solidarity to begin to overcome political, social, economic, religious, cultural, and territorial differences. It is possible through involving all categories of society in making the new social contract. This includes consideration and respect for victims of war and displaced populations and encouraging volunteering and cooperation on the local level.

This intersects with the importance of dismantling war economies, providing productive sectors and fair opportunities for all members of society to participate in the reconstruction process and encouraging decent work conditions. This includes the development of an institutional, social, and economic environment to provide opportunities for all, especially those who got affected by war including the forced displaced people. This also includes cooperative work to reinvest in infrastructure, manpower, and developing departmental competence. This new environment should work to compensate and overcome the effects of the deprivation of education, healthcare and nutrition services.

Efforts for peace should seek to establish a humanitarian protection system, that can address the shackles of poverty, exclusion, and deprivation, and provide quality care for children and war injured. It is important to set the proper legal and moral restrictions to prevent the use of health, education services and food to be used as weapons of war ever again. Civil society stands out here, as a new economic contributor that can expand the economic base, to serve the public interest.

By focusing on factors that determine forced displacement, it is hoped that this research will be used to develop policies that increase the return for refugees and forced displaced people. This could also help rebuild the social bonds that are necessary to return life to communities and families who have lost their possessions.

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Annex (1): Population survey 2014

1. Survey methodology

The Population Status Survey 2014 aims to provide a comprehensive database in order to diagnose and understand the demographic, economic, social, and institutional status of the population in Syria, in addition to analyzing the impacts of the crisis, including the following objectives:

- Describe geographical distribution of the population in terms of IDPs and residents in their areas, and monitor their movement.

- Identify the key population demographic characteristics across the whole of the country.

- Illustrate the economic status of the population in terms of employment opportunities, economic activities, and the main sources of income.

- Describe living conditions in terms of housing conditions, public services, and infrastructure.

- Diagnose the population health and educational status.

- Analyze inequality, deprivation, and poverty status.

- Monitor the key social characteristics of population.

- Identify and assess the role of de facto institutions.

Given the exceptional nature of the survey under the complex circumstances of the armed conflict, the survey team worked to develop a tailored methodology to produce qualitative and quantitative indicators that describe the de facto dynamic situation. Consequently, multiple stages of the survey were developed including the use of available secondary data and then obtaining data from key informants present and active in the studied areas. Thereafter, many steps have been conducted to crosschecking of the data. The approach was flexible, in order to monitor to the new conflict-related phenomena from demographic, economic, social, and institutional angles. In this context, consultations with researchers from different disciplines conducted to agree on the technical framework for implementation.

The next step was to prepare research tools such as the research questionnaire, the researcher guide, the merging guide, and the form of emergency cases report for the purpose of this survey. Consultations also were conducted to ensure access to hot areas and to set mechanism for full coverage of all governorates. The survey was conducted in partnership between the Syrian Center for Policy Research, the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Commission for Family Affairs and Population, and a team of independent researchers, in collaboration with the Planning and International Cooperation Commission, the National Social Aid Fund, and civil society organizations.

The research covers all residents and displaced people, in all of Syria. The fieldwork was conducted through questions directed to key informants in their areas, taking into account the following:

- Identifying the geographical study unit based on the "sub-district" in all areas of the Syrian governorates, and "neighborhood" for the city centers, where three key informants were interviewed in each studied area.

- Consulting the governorate team and the survey core team about the extent of homogeneity (based on impact of the crisis on the humanitarian and physical aspects) in the sub-district or neighborhood. In the event of lack of homogeneity, the subdistrict was separated into several study zones (based on clusters of villages) and, thus, resumes the survey on this basis.

- Preparing a list of researcher observations to be attached with the questionnaire. In the event of the researcher's inability to access the studied area for security reasons, the available secondary data were the basis for data cross-check. However, the presence of researcher and key informants at site at the studied area is the basis for the survey.

- Conducting fieldwork in the hot areas through the following steps:
  o When possible, rely on researchers from the studied areas.

o Interview people who are familiar with the situation; interviews can be conducted outside the areas.

o Interview key informants via electronic means or telephone if personal meeting is not possible.

o Maintain continual communication during the survey period to monitor dynamics and changes.

- Determining selection criteria for the key informants, including being wellinformed of the studied area, and being objective regardless of their affiliations; in addition, having

- access to updated information and data related to the studies' themes including socioeconomic, demographic, and institutional ones. The selection criteria for the key informants included the following:

o Being a citizen of the governorate, preferably from the studied area.

o Being interested in, and well informed of, circumstances in the studied area.

o Representing the local community.

o Representing a variety of intellectual and professional backgrounds.

o Engaging in public action for public good.

o Representing women and different age groups.

2. Survey team

The survey team includes experts, researchers, specialists, administrators, and representatives of the partners. The team includes three basic working groups: the research team, the field team, and the technical team. The field team includes governorate teams, which are formed of the team coordinator and a number of field researchers; they have been trained by the research team and have the following duties:

- Prepare the plan of action in terms of implementation and time framework in coordination with research team.

- Determine the scope of work in terms of geographic areas and the available secondary data in each governorate based on the research team preliminary recommendation.

- Collect the available secondary data and information about the governorate.

- Nominate the key informants in accordance with the agreed upon criteria with the core team.

- Conduct interviews with the key informants, with full commitment to the researcher guide, and complete researcher observation list.

- Prepare reports on emergencies in case they occur, in coordination with the research team.

- Provide the research team with verified information and data.

A set of criteria was adopted for the selection of the researchers who will work on the survey; the research is nontraditional and is conducted under complex and dangerous circumstances. The Central Bureau of Statistics Researchers selected and formed the field teams. Invitations were extended to independent researchers who showed interest in participating in the survey, in addition to volunteers from civil society. A desk selection was conducted in the first phase; the final selection was carried out subsequent to the training sessions. The criteria for selecting the researchers were that they be resident in the studied governorate; hold at least a secondary school certificate; have working experience in research, statistical and fieldwork, especially in the social sciences; be committed to scientific authenticity, and objectivity; be willing to work as a volunteer; and be able to communicate effectively.

The core team conducted daily assessment and follow-up of the teams' performance and made several field visits to verify the quality of work. The governorate coordinators also followed up the researchers' performance. For instance, a large number of one governorate's team was excluded because they were not committed to the survey's standards; consequently, the team had been reshaped. Another stage of assessment of the teams' work was conducted during the questionnaires' verification, which resulted in returning some questionnaires to the field and consequently excluding some researchers.

Four intensive training workshops on the survey's mechanism of implementation were held to clarify the objectives of the population status survey, the survey methodology and the work. Descriptions of the questionnaire and the researcher guide were interactively provided, in addition to clarifications of the mechanism and rules of the merger and research code of ethics. The researchers received precrisis secondary data on the studied areas, which included information on population, education, population structure by age and gender, employment status, and the household expenditure and firms' distributions to understand the studied areas. Furthermore, preliminary tests were carried out on the selection of studied areas.

3. Survey tools

Several survey tools were used, the first of which were secondary information and data, including all official and non-official publications, studies, and reports relating to the studied areas. The research team worked to benefit from the available formal and informal secondary data. Many sources were provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics about the pre-crisis period, as they were working on surveys on the labor force, household income and expenditure, the family health, industrial firms, population censuses, and data on national accounts, education and vital records.

The main tool of the survey was the questionnaire, which contained quantitative and qualitative questions prepared in accordance with the main themes of the research and, hence, covered the demographic, economic, social and institutional aspects. The research and technical teams have designed the questionnaire with the participation of the governorate teams to ensure practicality and provision of the required data and indicators as targeted in the research. The technical and research teams developed the questionnaire and the researcher guide to ensure accurate description of the questions.

The questionnaire included a section for the researcher's observations. It was prepared so that a researcher should be able to record the indicators and prominent phenomena in the studied area, enabling comparison with key informants' answers as a mean of verification. It is worth noting that each questionnaire was completely filled by a single key informant and not more than one; the key informant is entitled to collect information from whomever deems fit for the purpose, but the researcher does not ask more than one key informant to complete a specific questionnaire.

After completing the three questionnaires for each studied area, these questionnaires were merged into a new questionnaire, according to the merging guide, by the governorate team's coordinator and the researchers' team involved in the studied area. In case of inconsistency in any of the qualitative answers or significant differences in the quantitative ones (more than 10 per cent) or in the explanation, reference is made to the key informants for reassurance. If the discrepancy in the results persists, additional questionnaires were conducted with new key informants to reach more objective understanding of the studied area. Conducting the merging process by the field team is intended to avoid relying on averages and exclude the questionnaires that show bias or lack of understanding of the studied region from the field; this process was carried out before data entry.

The teams were directed to prepare the emergency report for monitoring changes that have occurred in the studied area during the research period, immediately after the completion of the areas' questionnaires; henceforth, to update data that have changed as a result of the emerging circumstances. The research team also prepared the research code of ethics, a set of conditions that must be adhered to by the participants in the survey to ensure the confidentiality of the data, the safety of researchers and key informants, and the objectivity of results.

4. Implementation of fieldwork

More than 250 scholars and experts, supervisors, checkers, encoders, programmers, and administrative assistants worked in the field survey, allocated between research, technical, and field teams. The number of the studied areas reached 698, distributed among the governorates. Table B shows that the number of areas studied increased with increase in governorate size, population, and negative impact of the crisis.

The governorate teams selected the key informants who met the required criteria and communicated with them. When any key informant made an apology before the start of the interviews or in case of not completing the questionnaire, an alternative key informant was selected to reach three key informants for each area, while maintaining the integrity and security of the key informants free of any risks under the extreme conditions taking place in the country. The process of key informants' selection from varied intellectual, cultural, and political backgrounds entailed crucial challenges, especially to ascertain that they are non-polarized or engaged in violence acts; the diverse combination of the field teams played a major role in meeting this challenge.

Three questionnaires were collected from three different key informants from each studied area except for the Al-Rakka governorate, as it was difficult to reach three key informants in all its areas. Then the field team in each governorate merged the questionnaires. It is worth mentioning that one of the research terms forbade any one researcher to interview all three key informants from the same area, to avoid the researcher's bias.

Table A; Distribution of the studied areas, questionnaires, and duration of interviews per governorate			
	Number of Studied areas	Number of questionnaires	The average duration of the interview (Key-informant /hour)
Damascus	55	220	5.86
Aleppo	138	552	3.85
Rif Dimashq	100	399	2.40
Homs	45	180	5.19
Hama	43	172	4.44
Lattakia	50	200	4.66
Idlib	47	188	5.24
Al-Hasakah	40	160	3.28
Deir ez-Zur	45	180	4.73
Tartus	37	148	4.82
Raqqa	12	19	4.31
Daraa	57	228	3.24
As Suwayda	22	88	3.33
Al Qunaitra	7	28	5.14
Syria	698	2762	4.10

Source: The Population Status Survey, 2014 and SCPR's calculations.

Most of the interviews were conducted between April and June of 2014, while some required revisiting to the field in July and August. Most of the questionnaires required more than one interview with the key informant; some cases required three interviews with the same informant, as a result of the complexity of the questionnaire, which required time from key informants to collect and verify the necessary information.
The average time of the interviews to complete one questionnaire was 4.1 hours (Table A), which entailed great efforts by the researchers and the key informants. Taking the prevailing circumstances in each area, the time varied between governorates and regions, and this time does not include the time for questionnaire-merging, which was executed by the researchers' team in the governorate. The key informants have kindly devoted so much time to complete the questionnaires and have worked on the survey without any kind of financial incentives.

52 per cent of the interviews were carried out within the studied area, while 48 per cent were held outside, especially in the governorates of Deir-ez-zor, Aleppo, Al-Rakka, Rural Damascus, Idleb, Hama, and Daraa which witnessed complicated conflict-related circumstances. 95 per cent of the interviews were conducted through a personal direct interview with the key informant, 4 per cent over telephone, and only 1 per cent via electronic interviews. The high percentage of personal interviews is due to the flexibility in the interview location. In case of necessity, the interview was made available outside the studied area, but when the direct interview was awkward in some areas, the electronic means have been used.

The average age of key informants was 46 years at the national level, and ages ranged between 19 and 83 years. Their age was associated with the key informants' standards in terms of their work in public affairs and their extensive acquaintance of the studied area. The gender balance between female/male was not achieved in the selection of key informants, as the ratio of females among total key informants was only 8 per cent, partly on account of the current circumstances of the crisis, and on account of the social role of women, which includes a clear bias against them. However, the survey team tried to meet balance in the formation of the governorate teams, as females' participation reached 39 per cent of the total researchers.

The educational level of the key informants was advanced and considerably consistent with the selection criteria to meet the survey's different goals in understanding the studied areas. The portion of university degrees and institutes certificate holders reached 65 per cent; those with secondary school certificates were 23 per cent; those with basic education certificates were 11 per cent;

and elementary school graduates or below were about 1 per cent.

After the completion of key informants' interviews, the field teams in the governorates merged the questionnaires of each studied area in accordance with the merging guide and sent all questionnaires to the research team. Teams worked collectively to scrutinize the detailed questionnaires and to check whether they were comprehensive and dedicated to the set criteria and merger standards. The teams also verified whether the explanation of key informants (comments) complemented the quantitative data and were consistent with the researchers' observations. In the event of major discrepancies, the questionnaires were returned to the field to modify the observations. In the case of minor discrepancies, a phone call to communicate with the field teams was sufficient for adjustments. After this stage, the coding team worked on the preparation of the encoding lists for the questions in order to facilitate the entry process and the subsequent analysis, such as encoding the term "Other" or encoding new economic activities in various areas, as well as the integration of coding in the entry program by the technical team.

The technical team of the Central Bureau of Statistics prepared the entry process software, which included some of the initial verification rules. The Central Bureau of Statistics team carried out the digital entries for all questionnaires, i.e. the field and merged questionnaires, in addition to entering the explanation for the merged questionnaires. Pursuant to this process, the research team designed a program to verify the accuracy of data and merger, upon which they produced reports of the detailed observations. The entry team and the research team worked to adjust the reports in accordance with the specific rules or by returning them to the field teams.

The survey produced more than a hundred indicators for each studied area, enabled for clustering at the level of the districts, regions, governorates, and country. The processing software to analyze the results was prepared by technical and research teams to include data and indicators of demographic, economic and living conditions, education, health, and social and institutional sections. The teams produced and verified data at the level of the areas studied. The multi-discipline team also worked on the analysis of the results of the population, economic, and social issues.

The report used the following software for data entry: (CSpro) for the production of indicators; (SPSS 21), for data analysis; (Stata 12, Eviews 7), also used (MORTPAK 4.3) and (Population Analysis System PAS) to conduct analysis and demographic projections, in addition to (ArcGIS 10.2. 2) for maps production.

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